ACCESSIBILITY OF SELF-IMAGES FOLLOWING SELF-PRESENTATIONS

BY

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In using decision latency to examine the accessibility of self-images, this study expanded upon previous studies by incorporating decisions about the self-descriptiveness of degrees of the target trait in addition to such decisions for the trait at large. Further, these measures were collected before and after an interview in which the subject made a self-presentation reflecting a degree of the target trait that was previously labeled self-descriptive or non-self-descriptive. As expected, trait degrees that comprised the borders of the latitude of acceptance showed significantly longer response latencies than degrees that were more clearly self-descriptive or non-self-descriptive.

This differential latency effect resembles the inverted-U relationship between the prototypicality of an item and the time needed to decide whether it belongs to a category, as shown by Rosch (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 1975, 104, 192-233) and extended to decisions concerning the self by Kuiper (Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1981, 7, 438-443).

The interview presentation significantly attenuated the differential latency effect. The attenuation was not due to practice, for the effect persisted for all groups on two traits that were not the focus of the interview and on the target trait for a no-presentation control group. While all types of presentations attenuated the differential latency effect, the latency for the overall trait decision was reduced only following presentations of the most positive acceptable degree or of an extremely negative degree. Neither the response toward the overall trait nor the pattern of responses for the trait-degrees was affected by the interview presentation. These findings support the usefulness of examining the accessibility of self-images along with the content of those images in studying the stability and malleability of the self (Markus & Kunda, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1986, 35, 63-78). It is further suggested that in this line of study it is prudent to address decisions involving degrees of a trait rather than only the overall trait.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Prologue

This paper addresses one of the basic issues of human social life: How are our self-appraisals affected by our behavior vis-a-vis others? Related questions concern the implications for our understanding of the self, particularly regarding its stability and malleability, and the sense of identity it confers. These topics have been touched upon in a variety of ways in the history of social psychology, but have only recently come under full scrutiny.

Although the roots of this paper are in classic social psychology, much will be borrowed from the relatively new field of social cognition. In that light, the following passage from T. B. Rogers's chapter "A Model of the Self as an Aspect of the Human Information Processing System" is offered as a prologue.

> It is commonly held that a major feature that distinguishes the human from other animals is our capacity for self-awareness. The puzzlement and wonder attending this capacity have been fodder for religion, myth and art--and only recently, in an historical time frame, become the subject of intensive scientific inquiry. Our capacity for self-awareness is most strongly reflected in our day-to-day experience of continuity of identity. . . . This continuity of identity has become a critical construct of most self-theories. From James (1890) and his conception of the "I" through

> to Brewster Smith's recent analysis of selfhood as encompassing "the feeling of identity over a lifetime" we find this theme interwoven throughout our attempts to understand ourselves. As the research begins to unfold in the cognitive domain, and social and personality psychologists begin to interact with cognitive psychologists . . . it becomes increasingly appropriate to ask if we can analyze these "feelings of identity" from a cognitive perspective. Can we, in the tradition of our colleagues studying the processes of pattern recognition or semantic memory, begin to unravel some of the mysteries attending selfhood? Perhaps an understanding of the processes involved in the interpretation of social and personal information will provide insight into this age-old problem of identity. (1981, p.193)

The cognitive approach has proven helpful in understanding the self, as can be seen in the work of Rogers and others. However, until very recently, cognitive approaches to identity have for the most part ignored this notion of selfhood across time, focusing instead on self-related phenomena at a given time.

The present paper sought to build upon the framework provided by social cognition researchers such as Rogers and extend the approach to address changes over time, to examine the paradox of the malleable yet stable self. First, in a brief historical retrospective the treatment of the feeling of identity over time in the writing of William James will be discussed. This account will lead to a brief review of the theoretical approach upon which the proposed study is based: Schlenker's self-identification theory. Next, the relevant current literature from the study of changes in self-appraisals following self-presentational behaviors and

from the social cognitive study of the self will be discussed. Finally, a study will be discussed that applied the techniques borrowed from social cognition to the assessment of changes in self-appraisals following a self-presentation.

William James and the Consciousness of Self

William James's chapter "The Consciousness of Self" in his classic work Principles of Psychology is a common setting-off point in discussions of modern thought on the topic of the self. Many of the insights James provided form the basis of much present-day theory and research on the topic, which is currently enjoying a resurgence. This section, while discussing these insights, will also address the possibility that James did not fully pursue some of his more influential ideas; later we shall see some implications of this possibility in the work of some of James's intellectual prodigy.

In his "Historical Perspective" preceding a collection of chapters on The Self and Social Life (edited by Schlenker, 1985), Scheibe described the resurgence of interest in the self, writing:

> One must return to the very beginnings of American psychology to encounter another period of strong interest in self and identity. The pragmatist-functionalist school, of which William James was the foremost representative, gave central importance to the self. In this as in much else, James must be regarded as a pivotal figure in the history of American psychology. (Scheibe, 1985, p.35)

Scheibe went on to trace the demise and resurrection of scientific interest in the self, concluding that, "with the emergence of modern cognitive psychology and with the growing recognition of the artificiality of the separation of psychological and philosophical questions, James is very much in the ascendancy" (p.36). The following section will address some areas of James's influence, in particular those resurfacing in the recent cognitive orientation to the self.

Of James's many contributions, three inter-related points are especially relevant to the present paper. First is James's distinction between the pure ego (self-as-knower, "I") and the empirical self (self-as-known, "me"); second is his famous declaration of the multiplicity of social selves; third is his exposition of the sense of identity provided by the pure ego. The impact of the first idea cannot be overstated, for subsequent acceptance of the empirical self as a viable topic of scientific study has been crucial in the re-emergence of self research. The second and third points will be afforded more than the typical cursory mention, given their importance to this paper. It will be proposed that the multiplicity of the social selves is never fully reconciled with the sense of identity over time; later we shall see how social psychologists are still grappling with these two points.

The second point of interest appears in what Scheibe describes as the most quoted passage in the chapter, in which James states that an individual

> has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. . . . From this there results what practically is a division of the man into several selves; and this may be a discordant splitting . . . or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labor as where one tender to his children is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command. (1890, p.294)

Here James is speaking quite specifically about the social (public) aspects of the self, as opposed to the resultant (private) self-feelings. The focus is on the various roles we play and the reactions of others, rather than on the effects our role-playing has upon ourselves. He does not scrutinize the possible impact on the man of this "division . . . into several selves."

Later, though, James does address the "Rivalry and Conflict of the Different Selves":

> I am often confronted by the necessity of standing by one of my empirical selves and relinquishing the rest. Not that I would not, if I could, be both handsome and fat and well-dressed, and a great athlete, and make a million a year, be a wit, a bon-vivant, and a lady-killer, as well as a philosopher; a philanthropist, statesman, warrior, and African explorer, as well as a "tone poet" and saint. But the thing is simply impossible. The millionaire's work would run counter to the saint's; the bon-vivant and the philanthropist would trip each other up; the philosopher and the lady-killer could not well keep house in the same tenement of clay. (pp. 309-310)

Here still, though, the emphasis is on the effects of laying claim to certain of one's possible selves and foregoing the others. It is in this context that James suggests the equation "self-esteem = success/pretensions." He also

posits a hierarchical arrangement of the types of empirical selves (material, social and spiritual selves) and their proper relation to each other. But the impact of their rivalries and conflicts on the individual's self-concept is not addressed.

In discussing the pure ego, the third point of interest, James begins to address the issue of identity over time. The most famous line in this regard occurs in the summary: "It is a Thought at each moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own" (1890, p. 401). This image of the passing thought moving through time is entwined with the idea that thoughts which were once present are now past, and so are now different in important ways from the present thought. Of most interest to this paper is the consequence that previous self-images and behaviors can only live through the present thought. Within the chapter itself James presents an impressive argument in support of this contention. In brief, he draws as an analogy for the stream of thought and temporally distant selves the herdsman and his herd: As the herdsman rounds up only those beasts with his mark on them, so does the thought accept distant selves that bear its mark, which is a warm, intimate feeling. He points out that this metaphor evades the Associationist problem of having the thoughts adhere to themselves. As the cattle constitute a herd only potentially, with the

potential realized through the herdsman, so do the distant selves constitute an identity only when brought together in the stream of thought. The thrust of this argument is that "Passing Thought is the only Thinker which psychology requires," which is a central focus of James's work. This argument is not, however, directed toward the discomfort clashing selves might instill in the self.

James is quick to disabuse the reader of the notion that he is to place undue emphasis on the unity provided by the passing thought:

> The past and present selves compared are the same just so far as they are the same, and no farther. A uniform feeling of "warmth," of bodily existence . . . pervades them all; and this is what gives them a generic unity, and makes them the same in kind. But this generic unity coexists with generic differences just as real as the unity. And if from the one point of view they are one self, from others they are as truly not one but many selves. And similarly of the attribute of continuity; it gives its own kind of unity to the self--that of mere connectedness, or unbrokenness, a perfectly definite phenomenal thing--but it gives not a jot or tittle more. And this unbrokenness in the stream of selves, like the unbrokenness in an exhibition of "dissolving views," in no wise implies any farther unity or contradicts any amount of plurality in other respects. (p.335)

Here we see James confronting the paradox of multiplicity and unity, but it is unclear that he has offered a firm handhold on the problem.

Of this passage, Scheibe has written,

> It is possible to regard James as contradicting himself when he argues first for a plurality of selves and then argues with equal conviction for the continuity and unity of self. . . . But the real point about James's view of self is that he does insist on having it both ways. (1985, p.39)

In support of the idea of "having it both ways" Scheibe elaborates on the "dissolving views" metaphor, which he sees as referring to predecessors of the motion picture. He feels that James's conception of the unity and plurality of selves is aptly illustrated in the cinematic technique of montage, where the camera moves around the subject or changes perspective.

> The visual sequence . . . is normally experienced as having unity, despite the jerkings about, the discontinuities, the lack of realistic presentation. The self is similar. James makes the claim that despite our many social roles and the masks they require, despite our combining dreaming with planning and hoping, and loafing, and loving, and feeling secure and alone at the same time--despite all of these discontinuities in the empirical constituents of of our selves, we retain an overall conviction of unity and continuity. Just as shifting one's attention from the montage to the making of the montage somewhat spoils the illusion, so the focusing of attention on that which creates the montage "me" tends to threaten that unity which once seemed natural. (1985, p.40)

This analogy can apply to the literature of objective self-awareness (Duval and Wicklund, 1972), strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 1982), and dramaturgy (Goffman, 1959). Each addresses the possible feelings of discontinuity and insincerity that may arise when we become aware of our efforts at creating certain impressions. The analogy addresses the feeling of unity that usually persists despite the intermittent awareness of inconsistencies, but it does not throw much light on the changes in self-image following these episodes of "inconsistency."

The closest James comes to discussing these concerns is near the end of the chapter, in a section entitled "Certain vicissitudes in the me demand our notice."

> In the first place, although its changes are gradual, they become in time great. . . . The identity which the I discovers as it surveys this long procession {of changes}, can only be a relative identity, that of a slow shifting in which there is always some common ingredient retained. {James cites as an allegory an account of a pair of worsted stockings that are repaired with silk until they are made entirely of silk.} Thus the identity found by the I in its me is only a loosely construed thing, an identity "on the whole," just like that which any outside observer might find in the same assemblage of facts. We often say of a man "he is so changed one would not know him;" and so does a man, less often, speak of himself. These changes in the me, recognized by the I, or by outside observers, may be grave or slight. (p.371)

James then goes into a section on "Mutations of the Self," but he is referring to extreme cases such as multiple personalities and the like. Other than this passage on the gradual changing of the me, James does not appear to reconcile the multiple social selves with the resultant identity. And this passage seems to refer more to naturally evolving changes than to changes wrought by the existence of many social selves.

In large part, this "deficiency" is understandable given the nature of certain of James's examples and images. At the same time, some of these instances, viewed slightly differently, could easily have led to discussions immediately applicable to some of the topics of current inquiry. While the bon-vivant and the philanthropist would

well "trip each other up," the multiplicity of the social selves would allow their mutual existence in front of different audiences. And more to the point that will be developed in this paper, one need not see oneself as either a bon-vivant or a philanthropist; one may, even in front of a single audience, be each of these to a certain degree.

This discussion is in no way intended as a rebuke to James. He appears to have framed his exposition of the consciousness of self in a manner that did not highlight the concerns outlined here; he cannot be blamed for failing to anticipate precisely the interests of those living 90 years hence. This discourse has been indulged in primarily as a preface to the forthcoming critique of current research, which oftens harkens back to James. It was hoped that such a look at some of the thoughts seminal to much of the research to be discussed might serve to illuminate some of the underlying assumptions and in turn suggest some alternatives. This line of thought will be picked up again later; for now let us turn to one modern approach to some of the issues James discussed.

Self-Identification Theory

Schlenker (1980, 1985, 1986) has provided a comprehensive yet detailed account of many of the same phenomena that James addressed. Starting with the basic features of self-identification, he moves from the determinants of behavior

through to the consequences of that behavior for the identity, which in turn influences subsequent behavior. Self-identification is defined as "the process, means or result of showing oneself to be a particular type of person, thereby specifying one's identity" (Schlenker, 1985, p.66).

> Self-identification involves fixing and expressing one's own identity, privately through reflection about oneself and publicly through self-disclosures, self-presentations, and other activities that serve to project one's identity to audiences. (1985, p.66)

To further define self-identification, and to clearly differentiate the intended meaning from possible misconstruals based on similar or competing approaches, Schlenker elaborates:

> Self-identification is, on any particular occasion, an activity. It is not merely a reflection of the self-concept, nor is it simply a mindless reaction to situational pressures or a cunning action with Machiavellian intent. Self-identifications are contextually bound and influenced by the person, situation and audience. Yet the actor extracts from them generalizations, that wittingly or unwittingly, comprise the self-concept, and once these generalizations are derived, they in turn influence subsequent self-identifications. (1986, p.23)

In the last part one hears echoes of James: The self-identifications are appropriated by the identity and are constituents of that identity.

Schlenker supports James's argument for both the unity of the self and the multiplicity of selves that are presented to others. He says, in effect: We have but one self, a theory that was created to explain and predict our actions.

And we have many self-identifications that have shaped and are shaped by our encompassing theory of self. Schlenker stresses that, like a scientific theory, the theory of self must receive consensual validation by relevant others.

Self-identification theory also offers a pragmatic analysis of why we come to hold particular beliefs. Schlenker identifies two interactive elements: (a) believability, or the extent to which a belief is a reasonably accurate construal of the salient evidence; and (b) personal beneficiality, or the extent to which the belief serves the holder's goals or values. These two elements are components of all our beliefs, though the emphasis may be on one or the other in any given situation. Schlenker explains:

> When applied to self-identification, this analysis suggests that within the range of potentially believable self-identifications, that is, the set of self-beliefs that can be justified and defended based on salient evidence, people endorse those that best serve their goals and values. (1986, p.25)

He labels these "desirable identity images" or "desirable self-identifications."

This believability X beneficiality formulation applies to the selection of a self-identification and to the reactions to a given self-identification (e.g., the degree to which it is appropriated by the self). The selection of self-identifications is an area that has been fairly well researched; see, for example, Baumeister (1982); Baumeister

and Jones (1978); Jones and Pittman (1982); Schlenker (1980); Schlenker and Leary (1982); Schlenker, Miller and Leary (1983). The present paper addresses the reactions to self-identifications, an area that has not been as widely investigated.

Regarding the selection of self-identifications and the reactions to self-identifications, Schlenker (1986) proposes two possible modes or processes. In the passive mode, self-identifications occur fairly automatically, without a great deal of thought or planning, and are made up of familiar, habitual patterns of behavior organized in well-rehearsed scripts. Unless problems arise, the behavior is carried out according to the script. Of the subsequent influence on the self, Schlenker says:

> To the extent that these self-identifications influence private self-appraisals, they are likely to do so through a more passive process without accompanying reflection, such as by the activity making a particular self-image salient, rather than by a more active process of contemplation and rationalization. (1986, p.40)

At other times, though, much thought and energy go into creating and carrying off a desired self-identification. This more active mode is engaged if the values, goals and identity images that exist in the situation are highly important, or if the individual anticipates or perceives impediments to the construction of a desired identity.

> Active assessment produces more intensified processing of information pertinent to the problem, including information about one's identity. Further, it produces attempts to reconcile this information with one's desired identity images as best as possible. (1986, p.41)

When active processing is engaged, people are more sensitive to relevant information than previously, including self-information (e.g., self-schemata and self-beliefs). The increased accessibility of the self-information is thought to provide a rich data base for resolving the perceived identity problem.

An important consequence of this active mode of processing is that the range and type of potential responses to a given self-identification are greatly increased. As we shall see shortly, a self-identification that is perceived as threatening a desired identity image may elicit the change in self-appraisal predicted by certain other theories, but it may also cause a "boomerang effect" where the change in self-appraisal is opposite the direction expected, or it may lead to the use of accounts (excuses and justifications) with little or no change in self-appraisal.

With this overview of self-identification in hand, we turn now to the few studies examining the effects of self-presentational behaviors on changes in self-appraisals and on other related responses. Then, we shall look at some studies applying the cognitive perspective endorsed earlier by Rogers.

Internalization Studies

In an early study, Gergen (1965) addressed changes in self-presentation over the course of an interview caused by

reinforcement and instruction, and also looked at the generalization of these presentations to post-interview measures. He predicted that subjects instructed to be self-enhancing ("ingratiation" in Gergen's terminology), knowing their self-presentations were inflated, would not show as much carry-over of positivity as those presenting themselves accurately. In fact, the ingratiators showed just as much carry-over. To quote Gergen:

> In terms of positive increase from the neutral testing to the generalization period, subjects in the ingratiation condition were quite similar to those in the reinforced-accuracy condition. It seemed that some changes in covert feelings of self-regard had been produced by the intentional modification of overt self-ratings. (p. 423)

Gergen found further that the generalization shown by ingratiation subjects was accounted for almost entirely by those who were aware of having used the reinforcement provided by the interviewer as cues for modifying their responses; unaware subjects showed virtually no generalization.

Gergen noted that somewhat similar results had been discussed in the literature on role playing and attitude change. For example, studies by Kelman (1953) and Janis and King (1954) found that the more initiative taken in playing a role, or the greater improvisation shown, the greater the subsequent change in attitude. Gergen notes that these findings have been explained in two ways. First, they have been explained in terms of implicit verbal responses which

differentially accompany high and low initiative groups. Those who demonstrated more initiative, it was reasoned, thought of many more arguments supporting their endorsed position. Second, Brehm (1960) suggested that subjects in the high initiative groups were committing themselves to a position that was dissonant with their initial attitude and the attitude change was the result of dissonance reduction. Regarding the first explanation, Gergen writes,

> It might thus be said that the aware ingratiation groups, in their more vigorous involvement, brought to mind many more positive features of their own personalities. Once out of the interview they manifested a higher level of positiveness in congruence with their immediately preceding view of self. (p.243)

With regard to the second explanation, Gergen notes

> Although such an explanation would be consistent with the present data, there seems to be no good reason for contending that the ingratiation subjects were in a position which would arouse dissonance. Subjects in these conditions were offered no choice as to whether to be ingratiating or not, and the experimenter made it clear that falsification of self-ratings was appropriate behavior during the interview situation. (p.243)

Several of the studies to be discussed will return to explanations similar to these two: (1) the greater pre-eminence of recently presented features and (2) dissonance reduction or similar active attempts at coming to terms with the situation.

Note that Gergen explains the changes in self-presentation as due to actual changes in self-concept. Upshaw and Yates (1968) offered an alternative explanation

of the preceding findings. They proposed that elevations in self-esteem on the post-interview measures were due not to feedback or self-presentation on a specific dimension, but rather to a feeling of success on the part of the subject for having successfully performed the self-presentation task. To test their hypothesis, they crossed computer-generated personally-evaluative feedback (positive/negative) with presentation goal (positive/negative impression), reasoning that if it was a sense of achievement or heightened mood that had led Gergen's subjects to increase their self-esteem ratings, then subjects who were given the task of presenting themselves negatively and received feedback that they had succeeded (that is, made a negative impression) should also raise their self-esteem. In line with their predictions, they found that subjects who were instructed to present themselves negatively and received negative feedback showed subsequent self-esteem elevations, as did those who were told to present themselves positively and received positive feedback. This finding is hard to explain in terms of Gergen's reflective reinforcement model, which would predict a drop in self-esteem following a negative presentation which had elicited negative feedback. However, one may question how similar the situations were. If Gergen's was a more truly social situation, the feedback may be responsible for the change; if Upshaw and Yates's task was seen as a

game of fooling the computer, the feeling of success may be more important. Of course, it remains possible that both processes are at work in different situations (see Schlenker, 1986). In any case, this study points out the need for focusing on content-specific measures (e.g., specific traits) rather than global self-esteem, in order to reduce the number of alternative explanations.

Fazio, Effrein and Falender (1981) reported an interesting study investigating changes along a specific dimension. In a technique borrowed from Snyder and Swann (1978), they asked subjects a set of questions that were designed to elicit, and did elicit, either introverted or extraverted responses. Fazio et al. hypothesized that this manipulation would increase the accessibility of self-images congruent with the responses. In accord with this hypothesis, subjects given the extraverted questions later rated themselves as more extraverted and even behaved in a more extraverted manner than those subjects given the introverted questions. The authors discuss the "intriguing possibility" that the modified self-concept may maintain itself for a period of time in other situations, in a self-fulfilling prophecy: "Believing himself or herself to be extraverted, an individual may make warm overtures to others, who then respond and treat the individual warmly, prompting the individual to respond in that way and maintaining the self-ascription" (pp.241-242). They relate

their findings to the Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas and Skelton (1981) article (which shall be discussed next), noting that "The present data suggest that such a strategic self-presentation can have implications for later behavior in a different situation" (p.240).

In the study just referred to, Jones, Rhodewalt, Berglas and Skelton (1981, Study 3) were interested in identifying the conditions necessary for the carry-over of self-presentation that was observed in two previous studies. They found that subjects who were instructed to self-enhance in a simulated interview showed subsequent elevations in self-esteem only if their presentation was self-referencing (as opposed to being yoked to a previous subject); the degree of choice in playing the role these self-enhancing subjects had did not influence the carry-over effect. On the other hand, subjects who were instructed to be self-deprecating showed the carry-over effect (lowered self-appraisals) only if they had been given high choice; the self-referencing/yoked variable had no effect.

The explanation Jones et al. offer for these results is that the self-enhancing subjects' changes represent a self-perception effect (or more precisely, a biased-scanning variant), wherein the crucial element is the degree to which the behavior is seen by the actor as self-reflective; the self-deprecating subjects' changes represent a cognitive dissonance effect, wherein the perception of choice is

crucial. The authors openly admit that this account is speculative and post-hoc, but note that it is fully in keeping with the Fazio, Zanna and Cooper (1977) exposition of the differing domains of dissonance and self-perception theories. They also comment on the implications for the nature of the self-concept:

> Since preference among the theories hinges in part on assumptions concerning the degree of stability and structure of the self-concept, it is tempting to turn this around and suggest that the degree of self-concept structure may vary with the evaluative implications of the behavior being accomodated. The self may thus be asymetrically structured: at the favorable end there is a range of values for each disposition that a person will consider applicable to the self-concept. Behaviors implying positive self-appraisal are likely to fall somewhere within this applicable range and raise few problems of inconsistency or dissonance. At the unfavorable end, however, there are few alternatives considered applicable, and the boundaries of self and nonself are sharply defined. (p.420)

In this conceptualization it is the positive nature of the presentation which makes it easily accepted and thus amenable to self-perception based internalization, or conversely, the negative tone which forces one to come terms with one's presentation and thus lower one's self-esteem.

Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986) sought to improve upon this conceptualization by addressing the possibility that for some people negative behaviors will be seen as applicable to the self and positive behaviors as inapplicable. In this case the pattern of influence of the variables discussed above should be reversed. Rhodewalt and

Agustsdottir tested this idea by adopting an individual difference approach (using non-depressed and mildly depressed subjects) in repeating the Jones et al. experiment. They predicted that the non-depressed subjects would replicate the Jones et al. findings but that for the depressed subjects self-deprecating presentations would fall in the latitude of acceptance and self-enhancing presentations would fall in the latitude of rejection, and the influence of the variables would show the appropriate reversal. Their results supported their hypothesis: For depressed subjects, self-deprecating presentations carried over only if they were self-referencing, with choice having no effect; self-enhancing presentations carried over only under high choice, with the self-referencing/yoked variable having no effect. The authors again propose that dissonance processes are responsible for carry-over following behaviors in the latitude of rejection, while carry-over following behaviors in the latitude of acceptance is due to a variant of self-perception theory stressing increased accessibility. We shall return to this proposed "increased accessibility" shortly; first let us examine some studies related to other aspects of the above studies.

Note that both the Jones et al. (1981) and the Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir (1986) papers refer to and implicitly rely upon the Fazio, Zanna and Cooper (1977) notion of different processes being at work in one's latitude of acceptance and

latitude of rejection. Neither Jones et al. nor Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir make explicit use of these latitudes, however. The former assumed that self-enhancing self-presentations would fall in the typical college students latitude of acceptance and self-deprecating self-presentations would fall in the latitude of rejection. Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir modified this idea somewhat, noting that the latitude of acceptance could contain some negative features and the latitude of rejection could contain some excessively positive features; moreover, they noted that for depressives, the latitude of acceptance might contain more negative features. Nonetheless, they were still operating on assumptions about the subjects' latitudes of acceptance and rejection.

Trudeau and Schlenker (1986) adopted a more rigorous ideographic approach, having each subject explicitly denote the degrees of independence he or she could (latitude of acceptance) or could not (latitude of rejection) accept as self-descriptive. The subject then presented him- or herself as being described by a level of independence that was in either the latitude of acceptance or the latitude of rejection, and was either more or less independent than the description he or she felt was most self-descriptive. Further, to test the hypothesis that self-presentations in the latitude of rejection would generate a more active response than those in the latitude of acceptance (Fazio et

al., 1977; Schlenker, 1986) half of the subjects were given a misattribution cue. Also, in keeping with the idea that this active processing might involve responses other than changes in self-appraisal (Aronson, 1969; Schlenker, 1986), subjects were asked about their responsibility for their self-presentation and how representative and truthful it was.

In support of the notion of more active processing following self-presentations in the latitude of rejection, it was found that the responses were affected by the presence or absence of the misattribution cue. However, as anticipated, these differences emerged not in the changes in self-appraisal but rather in the ratings of the self-presentation. Subjects who presented in their latitude of rejection (whether more or less independent than they viewed themselves) and did not receive the misattribution cue tended to rate the self-presentation as less representative of themselves than did subjects in the other conditions. Ratings of truthfulness and responsibility showed precisely the same pattern, but the differences were not statistically significant. Presumably, a subject who received the misattribution cue and presented in their latitude of rejection misattributed any tension he or she may have been experiencing from this self-discrepant behavior, and did not feel the need to justify or come to terms with the presentation and its implications for his or her identity.

Subjects who presented in their latitude of acceptance were generally not affected by the misattribution manipulation. However, those who presented in the least independent position they could accept and received the misattribution cue lowered their independence ratings, the only group to do so. The authors offered the tentative explanation that perhaps this presentation, being negative, was threatening even though it was in the latitude of acceptance; the misattribution cue may have somehow hindered counterarguing, and the effect of the presentation was a lowered self-rating (rather than the use of accounts).

The active process of coming to terms with unacceptable self-presentations, which led to greater use of excuses in the Trudeau and Schlenker study, has appeared in other guises in other studies. Of most interest is the "boomerang effect" wherein the individual is so intent on counteracting an undesirable self-presentation that the resulting self-appraisal goes beyond the original self-appraisal. Spivak and Schlenker (1985) found that subjects who presented themselves negatively on the trait social sensitivity and received information that the presentation was representative of themselves later rated themselves more positively on the trait than either other subjects who made an equally negative presentation but believed the presentation not to be representative of self, or control subjects who did not make a presentation.

Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1987) also found evidence of a boomerang effect. Subjects presented themselves either positively or negatively on the trait sociability, with all presentations coming under conditions designed to foster perceived representativeness. Following positive presentations all subjects showed significant increases in self-ratings of sociability. Following negative presentations, males' self-ratings did not differ from those of a no-presentation control group; females' self-ratings were higher than those for both the control subjects and the positive presentation subjects. It was suggested that sociability was more important for females than males, which led to stronger counterarguing in the females. Support for this supposition can be seen in the fact that in the negative presentation condition the females' presentations were significantly less negative than the males', which the authors interpret as showing resistance to generating an unflattering self-presentation.

McKillop and Schlenker (1986) explicitly examined the influence of the perceived importance of the dimension in question. When the subjects were told that the trait practicality was unimportant, self-presentations on the trait led to passive processing, with subjects shifting their self-ratings in line with the presentation, increasing them after a positive presentation and decreasing them after a negative presentation. When subjects were led to believe

the trait practicality was important, negative presentations led to increased self-ratings on the trait and also to denials of the representativeness of the presentations. Here we see the boomerang effect and the use of accounting, the results of active processing following undesirable presentations on an allegedly important trait. Also, the active memory search involved in the counterarguing process increased the salience of examples of practical behavior, as seen in the finding that for subjects presenting negatively, those who were told the trait was important generated more positive examples of practical behavior than those told the trait was unimportant.

Dlugolecki and Schlenker (1985) also tested the idea that self-presentations should make relevant self-information more accessible, thereby influencing subsequent self-appraisals and behavior. Half the subjects took part in an interview for which they were instructed to create a positive impression of their sociability, under conditions maximizing the likelihood of seeing the behavior as representative of self (i.e., they were given high choice in selecting the role and were allowed to provide their own responses; cf. Jones et al., 1981). Other subjects were told about the interview and its emphasis on sociability, but were told that they had been randomly chosen to provide comparison data and would not be participating in the interview. The subjects who participated in the interview

later described themselves as more sociable on an anonymous measure and actually behaved more sociably in a waiting room with a confederate (who did not know whether the subject had participated in the interview), being more likely to initiate conversation, talking more, and being rated more sociable by the confederate.

The Stability and Malleability of the Self

In the wake of these studies investigating changes in self-appraisal following self-presentations, some researchers have sought to explicate the underlying implications for the self, particularly in regard to its stability and malleability. Recall that in the Jones et al. and Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir papers the change in self-appraisals is attributed to cognitive dissonance and biased scanning or increased accessibility. Rhodewalt (1986) notes that this formulation is helpful in reconciling the paradox of the stability and malleability of the self. He proposes that "the apparent contradiction may be resolved by recognizing the difference between underlying stable representations of the self and the experience of the self" (p. 122). He sees the underlying stable representations as constituting the latitude of acceptance on any given dimension, and says these representations are "available." The phenomenal experience of the self is that particular self-conception that is accessed at the given point in time.

Which self-conception is accessed can be influenced by the social environment, a finding seen in McGuire's work on the spontaneous self-concept (e.g., McGuire and Padawer-Singer, 1976). Rhodewalt labels this accessed self-concept the "phenomenal self," a term borrowed from Jones and Gerard (1967), who defined it as "a person's awareness, arising out of his interaction with the environment, of his own beliefs, values, attitudes, the links between them, and the implications for his behavior" (Jones & Gerard, 1967, p. 716).

Thus, in the Jones et al. and the Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir papers, self-presentations (presumably) in the latitude of acceptance represent self-descriptions already available, and the observed change in self-appraisal is due merely to a change in the phenomenal self (i.e., which self-conception is accessed). Relating this idea to the stability/maleability issue, Rhodewalt writes:

> The latitude of acceptance is the underlying core of the phenomenal self. Current contextual cues, behaviors and affect serve to increase the relative accessibility or salience of one facet of the self over others. To the extent that other people and situations provide consistent cues, the individual will display apparent consistency and stability of self-relevant behaviors. Nonetheless, within any individual's experience is enough contextual variation and varied social feedback to shift the person's focus among social selves (e.g., academic to parent to athlete) and within self-categories (e.g., the thrill of victory and the agony of defeat). (p.129)

Note that in this account, for a given dimension (i.e., a given social self), the available facets of the self (the

latitude of acceptance) should remain fairly stable, even though the facet being accessed (the phenomenal self) at any one moment can differ.

For new degrees of a dimension to become available as self-descriptive, the latitude of acceptance must assimilate descriptions which had not previously been acceptable. Rhodewalt suggests that self-presentations of degrees that had previously fallen in the latitude of rejection can elicit the strongest change in self-appraisal, provided they are not otherwise explained away (cf. Trudeau and Schlenker, 1986). The original social judgement literature (e.g., Sherif and Hovland, 1961) found that attitude statements that were in the latitude of non-commital, just short of the latitude of rejection, elicited the most attitude change ("assimilation"), while statements in the latitude of rejection elicited little change and were frequently seen as more extreme than they were ("contrast" effect). In the present context, if a person can be induced to behave in a manner which he would normally not, and yet not explain the behavior away, his self-appraisals on relevant dimensions might change substantially. The literature in social judgement, self-verification (Swann, 1985), cognitive dissonance (e.g., Wicklund and Brehm, 1976), and cognitive conservatism (Greenwald, 1980), among others, bear testimony to the fragility and unlikelihood of such a process. Thus, as Rhodewalt proposes, within the

range of acceptable self-descriptions there may be significant variability as to which self-image is focused upon, and the self may appear malleable; outside that range, change in self-description is harder to come by, and the self appears rather stable.

Markus and Kunda (1986) also confront the paradox of the malleable yet stable nature of the self (James, 1890). They propose a "working self-concept" that consists of 1) certain self-conceptions that are so important to the individual that they form a stable core, that are "chronically accessible" (Higgins, King & Mavin, 1982); and 2) more tentatively held self-conceptions that are occasionally drawn from the universe of possible applicable self-conceptions in response to the ongoing social environment. With regard to the question of the malleability and stability of the self, they write:

> Malleability in the self-concept--variations in the working self-concept--occurs as the context of self-conceptions surrounding the core element changes. This mutability or fluidity will be fairly subtle; it will not, under most circumstances, involve a major revision or reorganization of significant self-relevant thoughts and feelings. Indeed, many typical assessments of the self-concept will not reflect these variations in self-conceptions. Changes of this nature require measures that reveal the differential availability of self-conceptions and measures that reveal changes in the meaning or interpretation given to various self-descriptions. (p. 859)

The measures that are being endorsed here have previously been shown useful in investigating certain aspects of the

self. Some of these earlier studies laid the groundwork for the Markus and Kunda paper, and will be presented prefatory to its discussion.

The Self and Social Cognition

In a widely cited paper, Markus (1977) showed the influence of self-schemata on the processing of information about the self. Subjects who rated at least two of three independent-synonymous traits as important and also rated themselves near the end of the scale were assumed to have self-schemata on the dimension, and were labelled Independents or Dependents, depending on which end of the scale they had placed themselves. Subjects who did not see the traits as important and who fell near the middle of the scale were labelled Aschematics. Markus found that having a schemata influenced subjects' processing of relevant information on a variety of tasks.

In one task, subjects were asked to respond "me" or "not me" to a series of dependent, independent and neutral adjectives. For the dependent adjectives, Dependents were more likely to say "me" than were Independents; for the independent adjectives, Independents were more likely to say "me" than were the Dependents. Of more interest is the finding that these subjects were generally faster at making "me" judgements for words congruent with their self-schema than for words incongruent with it. Aschematics showed no

difference in response latency between the dependent and independent words.

To test the influence of schemata on resistance to counter-schematic self-relevant information, in a later session Markus gave subjects bogus test feedback: Independents were told they were suggestible, Dependents were told they were not suggestible, and half the Aschematics were given each type of feedback. In performing the above task again, none of the three groups changed significantly from the previous session in their likelihood of endorsing the two types of adjectives. On the reaction time measures, the Independents and Dependents were again faster at responding to schema-congruent words, with the Aschematics again showing no difference, as above. However, the Independents and Dependents showed significantly longer average latencies for the second session compared to the first; the Aschematics did not show this difference. Markus concludes:

> It appears, then, that the longer processing times for the independent/dependent words may well have been due to the counterschematic information provided by the suggestibility test. Subjects with schemata appear to realize that they have received information about themselves that does not fit with their current self-conception on this dimension. While this realization is not sufficient to warrant a change in self-characterization (and thus no change in adjective endorsement is observed), it probably caused these subjects to reflect slightly longer to check this information against their schemata before making a judgement. . . . Because the Aschematics did not have an integrated picture of themselves on the independence-dependence dimension, the suggestibility information was not perceived as

> relevant to the judgments being made. The self-judgments and latencies for these judgments were, therefore, not affected. (p. 75)

Note that counterschematic feedback caused an increase in reaction time in the responses of Independents and Dependents for both independent and dependent words generally, with no interaction of the word-type and their schema (or the type of feedback). We shall return to this finding shortly.

Several other studies have examined the influence of the self on reaction time for self-relevant decisions. In line with their previous studies concerning the self as a stable underlying structure (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper & Kirker, 1977), Rogers, Kuiper and Rogers (1979) demonstrated a "symbolic distance effect" for self-referent judgements. Subjects first made self-ratings on 14 trait adjectives. For each possible pair of adjectives, the difference in self-rating was calculated (labeled a "step"). Then subjects responded to all possible pairs of the adjectives, indicating which adjective in each pair described them best. The steps and the reaction time showed a near-perfect negative correlation ($r=-.97$); that is, the greater the difference in self-rating for a given pair, the quicker the choice between them. This effect was so strong that the self-ratings accounted for 95 percent of the reaction time variance. Further, the likelihood that a subject would choose the adjective which had previously been given the lower self-rating (i.e., an

inconsistent response) increased linearly as the difference in prior ratings decreased (that is, as the adjectives became more equally self-descriptive). The authors conclude that ". . . trait discriminability is clearly related to self-ratings, with larger step-size indicating better discriminability among the traits in the paired comparison task" (p.439).

Kuiper (1981) provided convergent evidence for the self as a prototype. He found that adjectives that were independently assessed on a self-rating scale as being extremely like or extremely unlike the self had significantly faster reaction times when subjects were to decide if the adjective described them than adjectives which were only moderately prototypical or self-descriptive. This inverted-U function has been shown to support the presence of a prototype (Rosch, 1973; Schnur, 1977). We shall return to this prototypicality effect and the above symbolic distance effect when discussing the present study.

McDonald and Kuiper (1985) have shown that content congruent with a self-schema is processed more quickly than schema-incongruent content, a finding reminiscent of that of Markus (1977). Additionally, a concurrent memory task (cf. Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) did not interact with this pattern of results, which the authors say "provides initial evidence for self-schema processing as an automatic process, rather than as a process that demands attentional capacity" (p.171).

Fazio, Herr and Olney (1984) used reaction time to investigate attitude accessibility following a self-perception process. They had subjects either recall (Study 1) or anticipate performing (Study 2) behavior that was either manded or unmanded, and then make evaluative judgements on items relevant to the behavior. In both studies, attitude accessibility, as measured by the latency of the response to the attitudinal inquiries, was enhanced by the consideration or anticipation of unmanded behavior but not by manded behavior. The authors conclude that

> Apparently, just as Bem's self-perception theory assumes, freely performed behavior is viewed as highly reflective of one's attitude toward the object in question. Consequently, the actor in such a case can strongly associate the evaluation implied by the behavior with the attitude object, producing an attitude that is highly accessible from memory. (p. 284)

In light of the Markus (1977) study finding that counter-schematic feedback caused the Independents and Dependents to show longer latency for both dependent and independent adjectives, it is worth noting that in the Fazio et al. study the analysis of the reaction time was conducted on items referring to the general attitude in question, not to one end of the attitudinal dimension (i.e., only the favorable or unfavorable end).

This contrast in possible approaches to analyzing changes in reaction times becomes important when we return to the abovementioned Markus and Kunda article that incorporated reaction time in addressing the stability and malleability

of the self. In this study, subjects were made to feel either exceptionally similar to ("similarity" subjects) or different from ("uniqueness" subjects) three confederates. Following Fromkin (1970), the authors reasoned that extreme similarity or uniqueness are aversive states that should lead subjects to reaffirm their less-extreme self-conceptions by calling to mind self-veryifying self-conceptions (Swann & Hill,1982; Tesser & Campbell, 1983). They say:

> In fact, the consequences of an embarrassing or a challenging self-relevant event may actually be a momentary rise in self-esteem or a brief period of self-promotion caused by the positive self-conceptions that are recruited to counteract the initially negative thoughts about the self (see also Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1985; Steele & Liu, 1983). (Markus & Kunda, 1986, p. 859)

This quote calls to mind the "boomerang effects" discussed earlier. In this study, though, the increased accessibility of the self-conceptions that are called to mind to counteract the extreme self-images is not expected to affect self-ratings. The authors did not expect the manipulations to cause broad revisions in the core self-conceptions, such as could be seen in self-descriptions on an adjective checklist. Rather, they expected the "called to mind" self-verifying self-conceptions to be more accessible than other self-conceptions, rendering subtle effects.

Rather than merely infer increased accessibility (cf., Rhodewalt, 1986) Markus and Kunda measured reaction time in accepting or rejecting adjectives relating to similarity and

uniqueness. As they expected, the manipulations did not lead subjects to differentially accept or reject the uniqueness or similarity words. Also as expected, they found that, with respect to uniqueness words, the similarity subjects were faster to respond "me" than were the uniqueness subjects; with respect to the similarity words, the uniqueness subjects were faster to respond "me" than were the similarity subjects. They conclude that the stability of the self-concept is evident in the first (null) finding, and the malleability of the self-concept is evident in the second finding. This account will now be scrutinized, not so much to find fault with the article as to anticipate the present study.

First, the conclusions drawn from the lack of differences between the treatment groups in the endorsement of uniqueness and similarity adjectives are questionable. The use of a null effect to support a prediction is always troublesome, and is especially so when the measure used is of less than optimal sensitivity. Although it is rank speculation, one can imagine that the uniqueness and similarity subjects may well have differed on <u>self-ratings</u> of uniqueness and similarity; such a reaction to social feedback is common in the literature (e.g., S. C. Jones, 1973). In contrast, it would likely require a very powerful manipulation to lead a subject to respond differently to a broad adjective such as "unique," when the response involves

only accepting or rejecting that adjective as self-descriptive. One could argue that this decision is a probabilistic event and that including many such traits would allow for the effect. However, for any summative effect to emerge there must be some difference at the individual response level, so the problem remains the same.

To facilitate discussion of the Markus and Kunda study and lay the groundwork for the present study, a working model of the process of accepting or rejecting a trait or phrase as self-descriptive is offered. It is proposed that the decision to accept or reject a general trait description as self-descriptive occurs in two stages: First, the phenomenal-self is placed along a scale, relative to the currently salient comparison group; second, if this placement is close enough to the appropriate end of the scale in question, the trait is accepted. The salient comparison group and what is "close enough" may both be affected by the social situation (e.g., Morse & Gergen, 1970), mood, instructions, and so forth.

The internalization of self-presentation studies discussed earlier that showed changes in self-appraisal showed these changes on self-rating scales. We can apply this working model to a hypothetical situation in which these subjects would be asked to accept or reject general trait adjectives: If the changes in self-rating were extreme enough to cross the "accept the trait" threshold, then the

subject would alter the endorsement of the trait (e.g., accepting a trait which had been rejected). However, the self-rating could change significantly and yet not cross the threshold, in which case the trait endorsement would remain the same (e.g., the trait would still be rejected). Thus, providing the subject a range of responses (e.g., along a scale) would allow for change in self-appraisal that a dichotomous decision--or a series of them--would obscure. This point, while not original, is important to the study to be discussed.

The model also addresses the second point, that concerning the malleability of the self-concept. Recall, it was reported that with respect to the uniqueness words, the similarity subjects were quicker to say "me" than the uniqueness subjects, while the uniqueness subjects were quicker to accept the similarity adjectives than the similarity subjects were. Before looking at how this finding is inconsistent with some previous findings and with the underlying rational behind the study, it should be noted that a close reading of the paper reveals that the statistics for the simple effects supporting this statement are not reported, only those for the feedback by wordtype interaction (p. 862). Thus, it is questionable whether the described effects are significant.

Assuming that they are, the pattern differs from those of Markus (1977) and Fazio et al. (1984), where the

manipulations were seen as influencing the accessibility of all aspects of the given dimension, rather than just one side. Markus found that counterschematic feedback slowed down decisions for independent and dependent adjectives generally, with no mention of any effect of the schema-type (or, equivalently, of the feedback). Fazio et al. simply analyzed response latency to the presented attitudinal target, with no consideration of whether it was congruent or incongruent with the subject's behavior. However, in the Markus and Kunda paper it is proposed that the self-conceptions elicited by the threatening feedback make one end of the relevant scale more accessible, but not the other end. In the present view, any self-conception that speaks to one's degree of similarity also speaks to one's uniqueness. The two might colloquially be called two sides of the same coin; it would be more precise to say that each self-image falls somewhere along a similar-unique continuum.

If an elicited self-conception is of a "similar" self-aspect or behavior, it might lead to increased self-ratings for similarity, but, as discussed above, it should not lead one to change such a global self-appraisal as whether or not one is "similar" (i.e., a yes/no response). At the same time, if it is assumed that similar is "the opposite" of unique, we could equivalently say that this self-conception would lead to lower uniqueness ratings. (If this assumption is questioned, one must ask why the uniqueness manipulation

is assumed to elicit this "similar" self-conception in the first place.) If a given cluster of self-conceptions (e.g., "similar") can be placed on either a uniqueness or a similarity scale--which they can--we must ask why they would enhance reaction time for decisions involving one end of the scale but not the other. To the extent that this effect holds, it would appear to be because the cluster is near that end of the scale ("similar"), making that end of the scale more like the phenomenal self (cf. Kuiper, 1981). Recall, however, that Kuiper also found that adjectives that were extremely unlike the self also had fast reaction times. If the uniqueness manipulation elicits "similarity" self-conceptions, it would appear that the unique adjectives should seem even more unlike the self; in this case, one might expect the reaction times for rejecting the unique adjectives to also decrease. Although its context was quite different, the Fazio et al. (1984) study seemed to support the notion of the entire scale becoming more accessible. Similarly, recall that Markus (1977) found that counterschematic feedback (analogous to the similarity and uniqueness manipulations) increased reaction time for both independent and dependent adjectives (i.e., for both ends of the scale). Therefore, the Markus and Kunda finding is enigmatic both in light of previous findings and in terms of the proposed model. Though this study was not designed explicitly to test this model or to validate certain

findings over others, it was expected to shed light on these concerns.

This thought brings us back to the problem discussed earlier with regards to James's influential chapter. While we recognize the multiplicity of social selves, we sometimes construe this variety as occurring among distinct dimensions, rather than along any one dimension. In light of this discussion of the Markus and Kunda article, it might be appropriate to wonder whether having subjects respond to general traits is more appropriate when we are interested in changes across dimensions rather than within a particular one. Most studies investigating the internalization of self-presentations are more interested in the latter case, changes along (i.e., within) a given dimension. Following is a description of a method that allowed the use of reaction time measures (with their attendant advantages) and yet addressed changes within a dimension in a manner more precise than asking subjects to accept or reject broad traits as self-descriptive.

Reaction Time for Responses to Scale Positions

In the previous section we outlined some possible limitations to the measures used in Markus and Kunda study. In that light it is ironic that one of their final conclusions is that

> Measures that assume the self to be a static structure and require individuals to respond to a very general description about the self are often

> not adequate for revealing how the individual adjusts and calibrates the working self-concept in response to the social situation. (p.865)

They endorse the use of more subtle measures such as reaction time, confidence of self-descriptions, and so on. While the use of these measures can be helpful, it is debatable whether they can adequately compensate for having subjects "respond to a very general description about the self," such as accepting or rejecting adjectives such as "unique" or "similar," or their synonyms.

The practice of having the subject simply answer "yes" or "no" to general questions (regardless of the domain) has often been disdained, both for psychometric reasons (e.g., Nunnally, 1978) and in light of the subject's discomfort at having to make a "forced choice." Preferred is the Likert scale, which provides more information and is experientially more acceptable to the subject, providing shades of gray in place of the black and white world of dichotomous items. Further, Sherif and Hovland (1961) argued that forcing subjects to choose just one point on a scale is still rather restrictive; they recommended allowing the subject to mark the position he or she preferred, other acceptable positions (forming the latitude of acceptance), other positions which were clearly unacceptable (latitude of rejection), and still other positions toward which he or she was ambivalent (latitude of non-commital).

In most reaction time studies, subjects are limited to accepting or rejecting a given adjective as self-descriptive. This is no doubt due at least in part to the desirability of having the subject keep a finger on each of the response keys, thereby reducing error variance in the reaction time data. This consideration would seem to render the use of Likert scales cumbersome if one is interested in reaction times. However, in the present study the following modification of the latitudes of acceptance and rejection paradigm allowed the subject the gradation of responses afforded by the Likert scale yet preserved the rigor of the reaction time task. As each point along the scale was indicated, the subject responded by pressing one of two keys, indicating whether or not that scale-position was acceptably self-descriptive. The resultant output provided not only the latitudes of acceptance and rejection but also the time necessary to make the decision for each scale-position.

Of course, there were certain considerations and compromises in such an approach. First, subjects did not mark the most preferred position. For present purposes, though, this was not of great concern. Our interest lay in comparing the time to respond to descriptions which are acceptable versus not, so which of the former was most preferred was not crucial. Second, there were considerations having to do with the different experiences

for the subject between the typical paper-and-pencil application of the latitudes measures and that presented on the computer monitor. Namely, to make the reaction time data as confound-free as possible, it was decided to randomize the order of presentation of the positions and to not indicate the subject's response on the screen. It was hoped that this approach would increase the likelihood that the decision for each position would be as independent of those for the other positions as possible, making the reaction time data more meaningful. If the positions were presented in order, there might be a sizable order component in the reaction time data, which would likely vary in combination with the subject's latitudes and thus be hard to remove statistically. If the subject's responses were indicated during the session, the presentation order might influence the reaction time for later positions, as the subject scanned his earlier responses. The chosen approach avoided these problems but entailed the risk that as the subject responded to randomly presented scale positions without being able to see previous responses, the pattern of responses might not have resulted in cohesive latitudes of acceptance and rejection.

To address this concern, pilot subjects were presented with the stimulus materials as described (i.e., randomly ordered positions without identification of response). Although there were occasional inconsistencies (e.g., a

rejected position between two accepted ones), for the most part the response patterns formed cohesive latitudes of acceptance and rejection. To minimize the risk of potential inconsistent responses, it was decided that after the reaction time data were collected for all nine scale positions, the subject would be given the opportunity to change any response he or she felt was "wrong." In this way the reaction time data could be cleanly collected and we could be relatively certain that the latitudes the subject indicated were the same as he or she would have indicated on a standard paper-and-pencil form. As a bonus, with this approach it was possible to see if positions near the border of the latitudes of acceptance and rejection underwent more reversals--"corrections"--as one might expect from the Rogers et al. (1979) study that showed that as the adjectives in a paired comparison became more equally self-descriptive, there was a greater likelihood of inconsistent responses (that is, the adjective which had been rated less self-descriptive was chosen).

To allow for more precise comparison of this study's results to that of other studies, and to address some of the ideas put forth in the critique of these studies, before the subject responded to the scale positions for each trait he first responded to the trait itself (e.g., "independent"). Also, in line with the working model discussed, the list of traits that were presented for response (along with their

scales) contained antonyms of the traits of interest (e.g., "dependent"). Thus, we were able to look not only at the endorsement of and the response time for two antonyms (cf. Markus, 1977; Markus & Kunda, 1986) but also at these measures for each of the scale points for these antonyms.

Of most interest, this approach allowed us to more finely assess the effects of a self-presentation on subsequent self-appraisals. After the subject indicated whether the various degrees of the trait independent were self-descriptive, he or she was asked to participate in an interview in which he or she was asked to portray a particular level of independence. This assignment was co-determined by the individual's response pattern and random assignment to a condition. The conditions were 1) the most independent acceptable position; 2) the position slightly more independent than that; 3) the least independent position; 4) the position slightly less independent than that; 5) the position three positions below the least independent acceptable one; or 6) a no-presentation control group.

After the interview the subject again responded to the scales on the computer and also completed another computer task and a paper-and-pencil questionnaire. In the other computer task the subject used a 9-point number pad to rate him- or herself on each of 30 adjectives and to indicate how certain he or she was of that rating, how consistent he or

she was on that trait, and how important that trait was to his or her personality. The questionnaire obtained final self-ratings on independence and also measured perceptions of the interview presentation, self-esteem, and other self-ratings.

Predictions

From the work on prototypes (Rosch, 1975; Schnur, 1977) and, most germanely, that on the self as a prototype (Kuiper, 1981), it has been found that elements which clearly do or do not resemble the prototype should be responded to more quickly than elements for which the decision is not so clear. Applying this finding to a latitude of acceptance and rejection framework, we might predict that decisions for positions near the borders between the latitude of acceptance and the latitudes of rejection should require more time than decsions for those positions clearly in the latitude of acceptance (e.g., the most preferred position) or clearly not in it (e.g., the most extreme positions). Graphically, such a prediction might look like Figure 1.

Alternatively, following the Jones et al. suggestion that the self is asymmetrically structured, with a sharp break at the negative end and a fuzzy border at the positive end, the pattern shown in Figure 2 might emerge.



Figure 1: Predicted Pattern of Latencies



Figure 2: Latencies Possibly Predicted by Jones et al.

If the latitude of acceptance is viewed as the available self-knowledge (Rhodewalt, 1986), we might expect its positions to be responded to more quickly than those of the latiude of rejection; the phenomenal self--the position seen as best describing the self at the moment--would theoretically show the fastest response, but this effect may be elusive since the other acceptances might be very quick. This pattern is shown in Figure 3.



Figure 3: Latencies Possibly Predicted by Rhodewalt

Also, since a narrower latitude of acceptance might indicate greater certainty, we might expect the width to be negatively correlated with the reaction times.

Of course, the initial patterns of responses and reaction time are only of partial interest in this study. Equally or more interesting are the changes in response and reaction time following a self-presentation varying in its degree of acceptability and positivity. Perhaps one of the simpler areas of prediction involves the overall trait decisions. As described previously, the interview presentation is not expected to cause a change in the outcome of such a broad decision. However, it is expected that the decision latencies wil be affected. Most likely, presentations in the latitude of acceptance will decrease this latency by making the relevant self-images more accessible. Recalling the Trudeau and Schlenker study, we might see differential effects of presentations at the positive (more independent) and the negative (less independent) ends of the latitude of

acceptance. In that study it was suggested that perhaps negative presentations that fall in the latitude of acceptance also elicit some active processing; in this case we might expect longer reaction time for this overall decision. The slightly incongruent presentations are expected to increase decision latency, particularly the less independent presentations. The extremely incongruent, less independent presentations will probably be seen as so threatening that the overall independence decision will be rapidly affirmed, in a finding similar to that of the Markus and Kunda study.

For the other measures, including the decisions for the scale points representing degrees of the trait, the general outlook is similar, though the specifics are more complicated. First, consider the presentations in the latitude of acceptance. All the theoretical approaches we have reviewed would seem to predict that the relevant self-images should become more salient, thus reducing reaction time. The presentation might serve to consolidate the self-image, perhaps tightening the latitude of acceptance or decreasing the latency of decisions near the border--possibly even for those rejected positions near the border. Presentations in the latitude of acceptance should decrease the latency for the 9-point self-rating without substantially changing its value. The certainty, importance and consistency measures should not be greatly affected,

since the presentation is just one more self-congruent behavior; the latencies might be decreased. By the same token, mood and self-esteem should not be affected, and the presentations should be accepted as representative and truthful.

As discussed earlier, presentations in the latitude of rejection just outside the latitude of acceptance might elicit a number of possible responses. Consider the variety of predictions one might generate concerning the effects of a presentation in the latitude of rejection near the latitude of acceptance (slightly incongruent presentation conditions):

1. Markus and Kunda's working self-concept formulation would seem to predict faster response times, as the self-verification process would make the arguments against accepting the position (i.e., self-conceptions supporting the acceptable positions) more accessible. The decision to reject the position should remain the same.

2. Jones et al. and Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir might predict that the position would now be accepted, since the presentation was under conditions promoting carry-over (self-referencing, high choice). The predictions for the response time are not clear. If the position is now acceptable (and particularly if it represents the phenomenal self), reaction time might be quicker. If, on the other hand, the dissonance process is at work as the subject is responding, reaction time might be longer.

3. Schlenker's self-identification theory would likely predict longer response time

> while the subject considers the presentation, probably counter-arguing the implications or explaining it away. The decision should remain the same--rejection--but it should take longer than before. As noted in the discussion, the theory also addresses the increased accessibility of self-information that can result from intensified processing; thus, the latencies could be reduced. It is predicted here, though, that the accounting process should increase the response latency. Since the conditions of the presentation should maximize its perceived representativeness, and since it will probably not be extremely threatening, the position might possibly be accepted, but this is not expected.

All three perspectives might offer slight adjustments depending on whether the presentation is more independent or less independent than the latitude of acceptance. For example, a positive slightly incongruent presentation might come to be accepted whereas a negative one might again be rejected. In the Trudeau and Schlenker study, however, a presentation in the latitude of rejection elicited basically the same responses regardless of whether it was positive or negative.

These slightly incongruent presentations may influence subsequent measures other than the latitudes measures. Although the position presented might be rejected, the self-rating (on the second task) might be affected, either towards carry-over or boomerang effect. If we see both carry-over and boomerang effects, the latencies for each may be informative (for example, the boomerang effect might be

the result of greater counterarguing, which might result in longer latencies). Also, incongruent presentations may decrease the certainty and possibly the consistency ratings, or they may lead to longer latencies on these measures. Finally, as in the Trudeau and Schlenker study, we might see less willingness to accept responsibility for incongruent presentations, or the tendency to rate them as less representative of oneself.

For presentations that are deep in the latitude of rejection (extremely incongruent presentation conditions), all three approaches discussed above would probably predict that the decision to reject would recur, though one could argue that Jones et al. and Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir would predict that the presentation would carry-over, since participation was freely chosen. An interesting possibility is that while the extreme position might still be rejected, the latitude of acceptance might now lie closer to it, either by stretching or by shifting. This is probably closer to the carry-over effect that Jones et al. and Rhodewalt and Agustsdottir would predict. Alternatively, in light of the boomerang effects witnessed in some studies, the latitude of acceptance might move in the direction opposite the presented position. As mentioned previously, the outcome here might depend on the positivity of the presentation: Extremely positive presentations might not be accepted but they might cause the latitude of acceptance to become more

positive; negative presentations, on the other hand, might lead to a boomerang effect, with the latitude of acceptance again becoming more positive.

For these extremely self-incongruent presentations, much should be learned from changes in reaction time, both for the position presented and for other positions. Since these presentations are removed from the latitude of acceptance, they may potentially influence the responses to the greatest number of positions. Presentations near the border (i.e., slightly incongruent presentations) will probably not, for the most part, substantially affect the responses to more removed positions. Extreme presentations, on the other hand, may affect the responses of positions between the one presented and the latitude of acceptance, particularly with regards to reaction time. Also, changes seen in response to the extreme presentations should help to understand the change in the slightly-incongruent presentation condition.

The effects on measures other than the latitudes measures that were discussed for the slightly incongruent presentations might also be expected for the highly incongruent presentations; in fact, they might be exaggerated. On the other hand, the presentations may be so self-incongruent that they are not perceived of as a threat, in which case the effects may not appear at all (other than the reduced representativeness and responsibility).

There are some other topics that are fairly independent of the type of presentation made. In the post-interview session, antonyms (e.g., independent and dependent) were included in the presented adjectives. As discussed in the context of the Markus and Kunda study, the working model would predict that the response latencies for one adjective would resemble that for its antonym, since both decisions rely on the same internal scale. Alternatively, the Markus and Kunda findings would lead one to expect that the latency for one adjective would not impact upon that of its antonym.

The data from the rating scales task should prove helpful in better understanding the data from the latitudes measurements (as well as the effect on these of the self-presentation). First, does the scale rating fall within the latitude of acceptance on the previous task? Is it the position with the quickest reaction time in that latitude (cf., Rhodewalt, 1986)? How do the other judgements for the trait relate to both the self-rating and the responses in the latitudes task? We might expect the latency of the self-rating to be negatively correlated with the certainty value and the consistency value, and to be positively correlated with the width of the latitude of acceptance. Similarly, the width of the latitude of acceptance should be negatively correlated with the certainty and consistency ratings. The relationship between these variables and the

importance ratings is less clear. Greater importance may cause one to deliberate more before responding, but if it is accompanied by greater certainty (which may or may not be the case), it may lead to quicker responses; it may be possible to partial out these influences.

Additionally, by combining the analyses just discussed, we can compare responses on these scale ratings for the independent versus the dependent adjectives. For each of the three levels of adjective desirability, we would expect the self-ratings for independent and dependent adjetives to be negatively correlated. Also, the latencies for those self-ratings should be positively correlated, as discussed above in the context of the latitudes responses. The certainty, importance and consistency ratings for independence should be similar to those ratings for dependence (a positive correlation).

CHAPTER II
METHOD

Overview

The primary dependent measure in the study consisted of pre- and post-interview assessment of the acceptance or rejection (as self-descriptive) of the trait independent and of each point on a 9-point scale for that trait, along with the latency of those responses. In the interview subjects presented themselves as being described by a position falling either at one end of their latitude of acceptance or just outside this latitude; this was crossed with the position being either more or less independent than the center of the latitude of acceptance. Another group presented the third position below their latitude of acceptance; the corresponding group above the latitude of acceptance was not included in the design, for fear that many subjects would not reject the three most independent positions and thus would have to be discarded since they would not be able to be randomly assigned to any condition. Finally, a control group did not participate in the interview. The basic design is a 2 (More/Less Independent) X 2 (Latitude of Acceptance/Rejection) factorial, with an offset Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group and an offset control group.

Subjects and Procedure

One hundred forty-four introductory psychology students participated in an experiment entitled "Computer-Aided Personality Assessment" in partial fulfillment of course requirements. Of these, 37 could not be used based on their pre-interview response pattern. This 25% rejection rate compares favorably to that of Fazio, Zanna and Cooper (1977), who were unable to use approximately 36% of their initial subjects. An additional 3 subjects declined to participate in the interview, and the data from 2 subjects were lost due to computer malfunction. Data from the remaining 102 subjects were included in the study.

Before the subject arrived the experimenter randomly assigned him to one of the six presentation conditions described. This condition, in conjuntion with the subject's latitude of acceptance, determined the presentation to be assigned, as will be explained shortly. When the subject arrived he was told that he would be asked to participate in two unrelated tasks, since each required little time. The experimenter explained that the experiment that he was involved with concerned the development of new computer-assisted measures of self-concept, and that in the other task the subject would be asked to serve as the interviewee in a simulated interview. This "other experiment" provided the cover for the necessary presentation manipulation and will be described shortly.

For the first task, the subject was seated in front of a personal computer. On the keyboard the M and V keys were labeled "YES" and "NO" (counterbalanced between subjects). The subject read the following instructions:

> In this task you are to decide whether each of a series of words or phrases acceptably describes you or not. You will record your response by pressing either the YES or the NO key. During the session, please keep the index finger of each hand on these keys. After you respond, there will be a very slight pause and then the next word or phrase will be presented, so please stay alert. Respond as quickly as possible without sacrificing your accuracy.
>
> In this first section you will be responding to a total of ten traits. First, the trait by itself will appear on the line to the right of the screen, below the phrase "Are you: ?". You will respond YES if you feel the trait describes you acceptably well, NO if you feel it does not. Then the following scale will appear to the left of the screen; the scale refers to the trait, which will remain on the right part of the screen.
>
> : Extremely above average
>
> : Very much above average
>
> : Moderately above average
>
> : Slightly above average
>
> : Average _____
>
> : Slightly below average
>
> : Moderately below average
>
> : Very much below average
>
> : Extremely below average
>
> Each of the nine positions on the scale will be highlighted, one at a time, in random order. If you feel that that degree of the given trait acceptably describes you, hit YES; if not, hit NO.

For example, if the trait is FRIENDLY and the highlighted position is "Very much below average," if you feel that you are very much below average in friendliness, hit YES, otherwise hit NO. Then another position will be highlighted, for example, "Moderately above average." If you feel you are moderately above average in friendliness, hit YES; if not, hit NO. You may respond YES to as many of the nine positions for each trait as you feel acceptably describes you.

When you have responded to all nine positions for a trait, you will be able to change your responses if you want to. Your responses will appear beside the scale: "Y" means that you hit YES, "N" means that you hit NO. If you want to change a response, use the arrow keys to position the pointer next to that Y or N, then hit the response you had intended. When all the responses are as you had intended, press the Q key. The screen will go blank, and after a slight pause a new trait will appear and you will begin the cycle over again. To familiarize you with the procedure, there will now be a practice run. If you have any questions at any time, please ask the experimenter.

Following the practice run, after the experimenter was satisfied that the subject understood the task, he cued the computer to begin and left the room. He went to the adjacent room, which contained another monitor hooked up to the computer. The subject's responses were displayed on it, allowing for the assignment of presentation (described below). The pre-interview session started with a filler adjective ("Practical"), followed by "Independent" and then another filler adjective ("Sincere"). At the completion of the response cycle for "sincere," when the screen went blank it remained blank: the computer "broke."

When the subject told the experimenter what had happened, he acted surprised and said that he would have to have the

computer consultant take a look at the computer. He suggested that, to save time, the subject could participate in the interview while the computer was being tended to, and that hopefully they would be able to complete the task later, if there was time.

He explained that he did not know much about the other task, but that the graduate student conducting this study agreed to help his professor recruit volunteers for a brief task. Thus, subjects were being asked to volunteer to participate in a "simulated interview" designed to give students in a personnel psychology class experience interviewing people. It was stressed that participation was voluntary, since the interview was not part of the present study, but that it would be greatly appreciated. That is, all subjects were given "high choice" in deciding whether to participate, to later increase the likelihood that the interview behavior would be seen as representative of self.

The subject was given a sheet describing the purpose of the interview and what would be asked of participants. More specifically, it stated that in order for the interviewers to obtain a wide range of experience, each interviewee would be randomly assigned to the way he was to present himself. Actually, each subject had been randomly assigned to condition A, B, C, D, E, or F, which in conjunction with his pretest latitudes scale determined the position he was assigned to present, as follows. As an example, a subject

with the following pattern of responses could be assigned to make a presentation of A, B, C, D, or E.

	-	: Extremely above average	
	-	: Very much above average	
C	_	: Moderately above average	
A	+	: Slightly above average	
	+	: Average	trait: INDEPENDENT
B	+	: Slightly below average	
D	-	: Moderately below average	
	-	: Very much below average	
E	-	: Extremely below average	

Key:

+ : accceptable positions

- : unacceptable positions

A : most independent position in the latitude of acceptance (More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance)

B : least independent position in the latitude of acceptance (Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance)

C : more independent, slightly incongruent position (More Independent/Latitude of Rejection)

D : less independent, slightly incongruent position (Less Independent/Latitude of Rejection)

E : less independent, extremely incongruent position (Less Independent/Extreme Rejection)

F : no-presentation control group

The sheet explained that the interview would focus on one dimension (independence) in order that the interviewer get a fairly in-depth impression of the interviewee on that dimension, rather than a diffuse global view. It mentioned that the interviewer would later have to justify his perception of the interviewee, and therefore could not be told that the subject had been assigned his presentation. This precaution was included so that the subject would not be able to quickly "take back" his behavior (deceiving the interviewer); in this way the impact of the interview was less likely to be diluted (Davis & Jones, 1960). Finally, the sheet said that previous simulations had shown that in order for the subject to be most natural and effective in the interview, it was best if he thought of times when he really saw himself as he was now to present himself. That is, he was urged to really "get into the role." (These instructions for the interview closely follow those of Jones et al., 1981, Experiment 3.)

After the subject finished reading this sheet, the experimenter asked if he would participate. Three subjects declined; they were debriefed, given credit and dismissed. The other subjects all agreed to participate, and the presentation determined earlier was assigned as follows. The experimenter told the subject how to present himself, using the labels on the scale from the computer task. As an example, if the imaginary subject above had been assigned to

the Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance condition, he would be told that he was to present himself as "slightly below average in independence, compared to other University of Florida students." As further points of reference, the experimenter mentioned the adjacent scale points, indicating that they were inappropriate. (For example, "It is important that you try to come across precisely in this manner; that is, not simply 'average' or 'moderately below average', but 'slightly below average.'") No mention was made of the subject's previous responses or how the assigned presentation compared to them. After the subject understood how he was to present himself, the experimenter briefly described the content of the interview, so that the subject would know what to expect, could think of responses conducive to making the proper impression, and could begin assuming the role. The experimenter repeated that the subject could decline participating if he so desired. He then took the subject to the interview room, saying that he would now have the computer consultant look at the computer. Actually, at this time he cued the computer to restart in preparation for the post-interview session.

After the subject entered the interview room, the interviewer (a research assistant) exchanged a few pleasantries, then began the interview, which consisted of four parts. (All the interview items are presented in Appendix A.) First, the interviewer described some

hypothetical situations pertaining to independence; the subject chose from possible responses. Second, the interviewer read a pair of words and the subject apportioned 100 points between them, depending on how well each described him. Based on pilot ratings these pairs each consisted of one independent synonym and either a dependent synonym or a neutral word. Moreover, the items in each pair were matched as closely as possible on Anderson's (1968) "Likeableness Ratings of 555 Personality-Trait Words" so that the subject would respond on the basis of the independence dimension rather than social desirability. In the third part of the interview, the subject was asked how much he agreed (on a 1 to 7 scale) that a certain word (either independent synonomous or antonymous) described him. Finally, the subject was asked to give a percentile ranking of his independence, relative to the U.F. student body. Throughout the interview, the interviewer recorded the subject's responses, providing an objective measure of his presentation. Also, after the subject left the interviewer recorded his guess as to what position the subject had been assigned, which he had not been told to reduce possible demand effects. He also tried to guess whether the assigned presentation was in the subject's latitude of acceptance or rejection, and whether it was more or less independent than the subject's typical self-rating. Interviewers were instructed to be neutral in demeanor so as not to reinforce the subject's presentation.

Control subjects were brought to the interview room without having received a presentation assignment. The experimenter said that he would return soon with someone to explain the interview. This gave him a chance to supposedly have the computer looked at and to cue it to begin the post-interview session. After waiting ten minutes, about as long as the interview would take, he returned and told the subject that the interviewer was not available, and that the computer had been fixed. From this point the procedure for the control subjects was the same as that for the treatment subjects.

After the interview was finished the experimenter informed the subject that the computer had been fixed and that there was time to complete the task. He explained that unfortunately the previous data were lost when the computer went down. This justified collecting the data again and reduced any perceived demand to respond consistently with the pre-interview session.

The subject was reseated at the computer and was told that the practice word would again be the same, since it was programmed to always be first, but that the remaining ten adjectives were randomly ordered and thus would likely not be in the same order as before. In the post-interview session the first trait to be presented was independent, followed by sincere, conforming, consistent, practical, dependent, non-conforming, insincere, and impractical. Thus

it was possible to assess changes not only on independent but also on sincere and practical, which were also responded to in the pre-interview session but were not the topic of the interview. Non-conforming was included to see whether any effects evidenced on independence would generalize to a synonymous trait. Dependent was included (as were the antonyms for the other traits mentioned) to allow comparing the responses for antonyms and the reaction times for the decisions (cf. Markus & Kunda, 1986).

After the subject responded to the scales for all 10 adjectives, the instructions for the next task appeared. In this task, 30 adjectives were used (taken from Markus, 1977). Fifteen of the words were independent synonyms, 15 were dependent synonyms; within each group, 5 were in the upper third of Anderson's (1968) list of "Likeability Ratings for 555 Adjectives," 5 were in the middle third, and 5 were in the bottom third. For each adjective, the subject rated 1) how well it described him, 2) how certain he was of this judgement, 3) how important this trait was to him (as a part of the self-concept), and 4) how consistent he perceived himself to be on this trait. These responses were on a 9-point scale, with the subject responding on a number pad. The instructions read

> In this task you will be asked four questions about each of a series of adjectives. You will respond by hitting one of the nine keys (1 - 9) on the number pad at the right of the keyboard. 9 is the high end of the sale, 1 the low end. Between responses, please keep your finger on the 5 key. These are the questions you will be asked for each adjective:

1. Where would you rate yourself on a 9-point scale for this trait?
2. How certain are you of this rating?
3. How important is this trait to your personality?
4. How consistent are you on this trait?

This is the format that will be used:

1. The adjective will be displayed on the line near the top of the screen.
2. You will respond with your self-rating.
3. After a slight pause, the word "CERTAIN ?" will appear in the middle of the screen.
4. You will respond with how certain you are that the rating you just gave is accurate.
5. After a slight pause, the word "IMPORTANT ?" will appear in the middle of the screen.
6. You will respond with your rating of how important the trait is to your personality.
7. After a slight pause, the word "CONSISTENT ?" will appear in the middle of the screen.
8. You will respond with your rating of how consistent you are on the trait.

9. A new adjective will appear at the top of the screen, and you will begin the cycle over again.

When the subject was totally finished with the computer task, the experimenter thanked him for participating and asked him to fill out a questionnaire for each of the projects, to provide feedback to the people in charge. The first questionnaire was for the computer personality assessment task, and was very brief (see Appendix B). It asked how enjoyable the task was, how difficult it was compared to similar paper-and-pencil questionnaires, and if the instructions were clear. This information may be useful in improving subsequent studies; the questionnaire was intended mostly to make it more plausible that the experimenter would be giving the second questionnaire, which concerned the interview (see Appendix C). This questionnaire assessed a number of possible reactions to the interview: 1) self-ratings of independence (supposedly for normative purposes), to see if any change in self-appraisal had persisted; 2) ratings of mood and the Rosenberg self-esteem scale, to see if the effects of the interview generalized; 3) possible accounts, such as choice in participating, responsibility for the presentation, and its representativeness; 5) other ratings of the interview behavior. The subject was also asked to recall the assigned presentation position, to estimate the impression he

actually made, and asked how these descriptions compare to the way he usually sees himself. After completing the questionnaires the subject was probed for suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, given experimental credit, and dismissed. The experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes: 5 minutes for the initial instructions and the pre-interview computer task, 15 minutes for the interview instructions and the interview, 20 minutes for the post-interview computer task, and 10 minutes for the questionnaires.

CHAPTER III
RESULTS

Manipulation Checks

Before addressing possible effects of the interview presentation on subsequent measures, it is appropriate to determine that the interview instructions themselves had the desired effect. As described previously, the More Independent/Latitude of Rejection group should have presented themselves in the most independent fashion, followed by the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group, the Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group, the Less Independent/Latitude of Rejection group, and the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group. An objective measure of each subject's presentation was obtained by calculating a z-score for each of the component scores of the interview and then averaging the four z-scores. In a between-groups ANOVA this average interview response score showed a highly significant effect of the presentation condition, $F(4,84)=13.27$, $p<.0002$. As Table 1 shows, the interview responses were generally in the desired order; the only exception was that the mean score for the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group was non-significantly higher than that of the More Independent/Latitude of Rejection group.

As another measure of the effectiveness of the presentation instructions, immediately after the interview was completed the interviewer attempted to guess which position on the 9-point scale the subject had been trying to portray (with 9 being "extremely above average"). On these estimates there was again a significant effect of the presentation condition, $F(4,84)=11.61$, $p<.0001$. As shown in Table 1, these scores follow precisely the same pattern as the subjects' response scores.

TABLE 1

Measures of the Interview Presentation

Presentation Condition	Subject's Response in z-score	Interviewer's Estimate
More Independent/Rejection	.51	6.93
More Independent/Acceptance	.63	7.11
Less Independent/Acceptance	.05	6.00
Less Independent/Rejection	-.38	4.83
Less Independent/Extreme Rej.	-.88	3.63

Related measures assessing the subject's perceptions of and reactions to the presentation were collected in a pencil-and-paper questionnaire at the end of the experiment. Most of these measures will be discussed later, but one is directly relevant now: This question asked how the presentation compared with the way the subject usually saw him- or herself on the trait independent. Again, there was

a significant effect of the presentation condition, $F(4,84)=3.91$, $p<.007$. In Table 2 one sees that the mean scores on this measure fall in perfect order with regard to the presentation condition. (Note: 15="far better," 8="same," 1="far worse.")

TABLE 2

Comparisons of the Presentation with Usual Self-image

Presentation Condition	Comparison Score
More Independent/Rejection	8.75 a
More Independent/Acceptance	8.65 a
Less Independent/Acceptance	7.78 a b
Less Independent/Rejection	6.44 b c
Less Independent/Extreme Rej.	4.58 c

(Means with the same letter are not significantly different in Duncan's multiple range test, alpha=0.05.)

In light of these three measures, it appears that the interview instructions had the desired effect: The subjects' responses, the interviewers' perceptions and the subjects' comparisons of their presentations with their usual self-images were all in line with the presentation condition assignments; however, the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance and the More Independent/Latitude of Rejection conditions were comparable in self-presentations.

Dependent Measures

Since the presentation instructions were effective, attention can now be focused on the influence the interview presentations had on subsequent self-appraisals, as well as on other effects not involving the presentation. These self-appraisals occurred in several formats. In the first computer task, subjects indicated whether or not a global trait was self-descriptive, and then did the same for each point on a 9-point scale representing degrees of that trait, in effect marking latitudes of acceptance and rejection. This first computer task was performed both before and after the interview containing the self-presentation. In the second computer task, subjects used a number pad to rate themselves (from 1 to 9) on each of 30 traits and to indicate their certainty of that rating, their consistency on the trait, and the importance of the trait to their personality. Finally, on a paper questionnaire subjects made some additional self-appraisals and gave their perceptions of and reactions to the interview presentation. The second computer task and the paper questionnaire were completed only after the interview.

First Computer Task

As expected, the interview presentation did not affect the likelihood of subjects' accepting the general adjective independent as self-descriptive: In the pre-interview

session only 9 of 102 subjects said "no." In the post-interview session, only 8 of 102 said "no."

Table 3 shows the mean latencies for the overall independent decisions for each of the presentation groups. For the pre-interview session there was, as expected, no effect of the interview assignments: In a 2 (Valence: More versus Less Independent) by 2 (Latitude: Acceptance versus Rejection) no effects approached significance, $F(1,96)<1.0$, ns. For the post-interview session, the Valence by Latitude interaction approached significance, $F(1,96)=2.90$, $p=.09$. The simple effects for the interaction revealed that within the Latitude of Acceptance, Valence had a strong effect on the decision latency, $F(1,96)=5.03$, $p<.03$. The More Independent group responded much more quickly than the Less Independent group; respectively, the mean latencies were 83 and 129 sixtieths of a second (the unit of measurement in which the decision latencies were recorded). In the Latitude of Rejection the effect of the Valence of the presentation did not approach significance, $F(1,96)<1.0$, ns. Also in Table 3 one sees that the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group responded as quickly as the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group. Duncan's multiple range test showed that the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group differed from the Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group but not from the Less Independent/Latitude of Rejection group (alpha = .05). The

quicker decision latencies for the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance and the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection conditions bring to mind previous studies showing quick processing of schema-congruent information (Fazio, Herr & Olney, 1984; McDonald & Kuiper, 1985) and extremely incongruent or threatening information (Markus & Kunda, 1986).

TABLE 3

Mean Latencies for Overall Independent Decisions

Pre-Interview:

	LATITUDE		
VALENCE	Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	117	127	--
Less	119	132	123
Control	154		

Post-Interview:

	LATITUDE		
VALENCE	Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	83	106	--
Less	129	103	84
Control	121		

The latencies for these and other overall adjective decisions are useful in addressing other topics mentioned earlier, such as differences between rather than within traits, and the relationship of decisions involving antonyms (e.g., independent and dependent). The mean latencies of the overall decisions were submitted to a mixed ANOVA, with

single degree of freedom contrasts set up to test the significance of differences between latencies of successive adjectives. The effect of the presentation condition did not approach significance, either alone, $F(5,96)=1.05$, $p<.40$, or in interaction with the adjectives, $F(60,1116)<1.0$, ns. The effect of the repeated measure ("adjective") was highly significant, $F(12,1116)=9.65$, $p<.0001$. The adjectives and their mean latencies for the overall decisions are presented in Table 4. The adjectives are listed in the order in which they were displayed to the subject, with the outcomes of the contrasts also displayed.

TABLE 4

Mean Latencies for Overall Decisions

Pre-interview		
Practical		160 >
Independent		128 =
Sincere		128 >
Post-interview		
Independent	*	106 =
Sincere	*	96 <
Conforming		163 =
Consistent		141 >
Practical	*	117 <
Dependent		144 =
Non-conforming		155 =
Insincere		142 =
Impractical		144 =
Inconsistent		151

(* : displayed for the second time; alpha=.01)

From these mean it appears that there was a substantial practice effect, in that the means for the post-interview

independent, sincere, and practical decisions were substantially reduced from the corresponding pre-interview latencies. Repeated measures analyses showed the effect of the session to be significant for each of the three adjective pairs: For independent the means were 128 and 106, $F(1,96)=10.7$, $p=.002$; for sincere, the mean latencies were 131 and 109, $F(1,96)=21.7$, $p=.0001$; for practical, the latencies were 158 and 119, $F(1,96)=14.9$, $p=.0002$.

This practice effect extended only to the precise words responded to previously. The latencies for the other words returned to the higher (pre-practice) levels. That is, the practice effect is due to the adjectives in question and not merely to becoming accustomed to the task. Of more interest is the fact that responding to a given adjective (e.g., independent) did not reduce the latency of the response to its antonym (dependent) or to a synonym (non-conforming). Separate repeated measures ANOVA's were performed to more rigorously make these comparisons. For instance, when the post-interview independent latency and the dependent latency were included as repeated measures, the adjective effect was highly significant, $F(1,96)=13.01$, $p<.001$. The same effect held for comparisons of the post-interview sincere latency and the insincere latency, $F(1,96)=31.07$, $p<.0001$, and the post-interview practical latency and the impractical latency, $F(1,96)=4.02$, $p<.05$. These differences are due to the reductions in latency caused by the practice effects for

the adjectives that had been responded to previously; the latter adjective in each pair did not show this improvement in decision latency. For antonym pairs in which both adjectives were being responded to for the first time, there was no significant difference in latency: For conforming and non-conforming, $F(1,96)<1.0$, ns, and for consistent and inconsistent, $F(1,96)<1.0$, ns. Responding to conforming and consistent did not significantly reduce the latency of the decisions for nonconforming and inconsistent.

These comparisons of latencies for antonyms and synonyms are unfortunately somewhat limited, in that there were usually intervening unrelated adjectives. If two successive adjectives tap the same dimension, then, theoretically, responding to the first could make accessible the same self-images needed in responding to the second, in which case the latter might show a decreased decision latency. In this task, though, only in one instance did two successive adjectives tap a common dimension: Dependent was followed by non-conforming. The contrast between their latencies was insignificant, as seen in Table 4. That is, responding to dependent did not lead to a lower average latency for non-conforming. Of course, there are several possible reasons for this lack of effect, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

Turning to the task that required subjects to respond yes or no for each of the 9 scale points, there were a

number of possible analyses, involving both the response and the decision latency. It was anticipated that the opportunity to change a response (for example, from yes to no) would be utilized most frequently for decisions near the borders of the latitude of acceptance. However, so few decisions were changed that this hypothesis could not be tested.

In order to make meaningful comparisons among subjects on their responses and response latencies for the scale points, it was necessary to devise an ideographic format that would allow comparing, for example, the latency for each subject's most independent accepted position regardless of where on the 9-point scale this position fell. Accordingly, for each subject the following positions were identified and given the accompanying labels (which make reference to the latitude of acceptance):

1. "High": The most independent acceptable point.
2. "Low": The least independent acceptable point.
3. "Mid": The midpoint between the the previous positions; if there were an even number of points and thus no true midpoint, the latencies for the two points midway between High and Low were averaged.
4. "Up One": The next point more independent than High.
5. "Down One": The next point less independent than Low.

6. "Down Two": The next point less independent than Down One.

All the analyses discussed in the next session refer to these individualized positions, rather than the original scale points.

Looking first at the post-interview independent scale responses themselves, there were no differences among the presentation conditions in the positions accepted, either on the upper bound, $F(5,96)=1.30$, $p<.30$, or on the lower bound, $F(5,96)<1.0$, ns, of the latitude of acceptance. That is, the scale points that comprised "High" and "Low" did not differ among the presentation conditions. Each subject's pre-interview response pattern for the independent scale was used as a baseline, but there was still no effect of the presentation on the post-interview latitude of acceptance: For the upper bound, $F(5,96)<1.0$, ns, and for the lower bound, $F(5,96)<1.0$, ns. Just as the interview presentation did not influence subjects' responses to the overall trait "independent," it also did not significantly influence the degree of independence they would accept as self-descriptive.

The decision latencies for these positions, however, did show many interesting effects. It was predicted that decisions for positions close to the borders of the individual's latitude of acceptance and the latitudes of rejection would require more thought than decisions for

positions more removed from these borders (i.e., more clearly acceptable or unacceptable). As can be seen in Figures 4, 5 and 6, these predictions appear to have been supported; subsequent analyses were performed to test the statistical significance of these patterns.

For each of the three adjective scales presented in the pre-interview session, the reaction times for the ideographic positions were submitted to a mixed analysis of variance, with presentation condition as a between-subjects variable and position as a within-subjects variable. A potential drawback to this approach is the loss of any subject whose response pattern was such that he or she did not have all the positions included in the repeated measures analysis. As it turned out, this problem occurred most often when "Mid," the midpoint of the latitude of acceptance, was included in the analysis: For each adjective a number of subjects had a latitude of acceptance only two positions wide, thus having no midpoint. To include the greatest number of subjects in the analyses, only "Down Two," "Down One," "Low," "High," and "Up One" were included in the repeated measures analysis. The other positions are included in the graphs to give a more complete picture of the latency patterns, but they are not included in discussions of the statistical analyses. Since "Mid" appears to differ from the positions that were included, deleting it made the analysis more conservative. For each

of the adjectives in the pre-interview computer session there was a strong effect of position on latency: For practical, $F(4,308)=3.60$, $p<.007$; for independent, $F(4,284)=2.62$, $p<.04$; for sincere, $F(4,244)=2.33$, $p<.05$. The longer decision latencies at the borders of the latitude of acceptance are reminiscent of those of Rosch (1975) and Kuiper (1981), who found an inverted-U relationship between an item's prototypicality and the time needed to respond to it.



Figure 4: Latencies for Positions of Practical (Pre-Interview)

In the post-interview session the effect of position on latency persisted for practical, $F(4,312)=2.61$, $p<.04$ and



Figure 5: Latencies for Positions of Sincere
(Pre-Interview)



Figure 6: Latencies for Positions of Independent
(Pre-Interview)

was still close to significant for sincere, $F(4,252)=1.97$, $p<.10$. For independent, however, the position effect did not approach significance, $F(4,300)<1.0$, ns. For independent there was instead a position by presentation condition interaction, $F(20,300)=1.55$, $p=.06$. Examination of the simple effects of the repeated measure "position" for each of the presentation conditions revealed that the differential latency effect persisted for the control group, which did not participate in the interview, $F(4,300)=4.12$, $p=.01$. None of the 5 presentation groups showed a significant simple effect of position. When the control group was excluded, the mixed ANOVA for these 5 groups did not approach significance for either the position effect, $F(4,256)=1.28$, $p=.30$, or the position by presentation condition interaction, $F(16,256)<1.0$, ns. The mean position latencies for the post-interview independent scale are shown separately for the control group and the 5 presentation groups in Figures 7 and 8. Appendix D contains the figures for each of the presentation groups separately.

It is also useful to examine the position by presentation condition interaction by looking at the simple effects of condition for each of the positions. The reason for the differential latency effect persisting for the control group and not for the presentation groups can be found in the extreme positions within the latitude of acceptance. For the most independent acceptable position, there was a



Figure 7: Latencies for Positions of Independent (Post-interview): Presentation Groups Only



Figure 8: Latencies for Positions of Independent (Post-interview): No Presentation Control Group Only

significant effect of presentation condition on decision latency, $F(5,96)=2.68$, $p<.05$. The means in Table 5 reveal that all of the presentation groups responded more quickly for this position than did the control group. Table 5 also shows the mean latencies for the least independent acceptable position. Again, the control group appears to have required more decision time than the presentation groups, whose mean latencies are all quite similar. However, this effect is not significant, $F(5,96)<1.0$, ns, probably because the error term is almost half again as large as that of the previous effect. As one might expect from looking at Figures 7 and 8, the simple effects of condition were not significant for any of the other positions.

TABLE 5

Mean Latencies for Extreme Acceptable Positions

Presentation Condition	Most Independent	Least Independent
More independent/Rejection	60	66
More Independent/Acceptance	49	70
Less Independent/Acceptance	54	62
Less independent/Rejection	39	53
Less independent/Extreme Rej.	61	57
Control (No Presentation)	101	91

With the persistence of the differential latency effect for all presentation condition groups on the practical and

sincere scales and for the control group on the independent scale, it is clear that it was not merely practice that attenuated the effect on the independent scale for the 5 presentation groups. Rather, the interview presentation involving the trait independent appears to have been responsible for attenuating the effect.

Second Computer Task

In the second computer task (which occurred only post-interview) the subject used a number-pad to rate himself on an adjective displayed on the monitor. Then, cued by words that appeared under the adjective, the subject rated how certain he was of that rating, how important the adjective was to his personality, and how consistent he was on the trait. Then a new adjective appeared and these 4 decisions were repeated. Thirty adjectives were presented in random order, with the 4 decisions for each adjective always occurring in the order described above. For each of the resulting 120 decisions, a response (from 1 to 9) and a reaction time were recorded.

The 30 adjectives were taken from Markus (1977). Fifteen were independent synonyms and 15 were dependent synonyms. Within each group of 15, 5 were in the upper third of Anderson's (1968) list of "Likability Ratings for 555 Adjectives" (labeled "positive"), 5 were in the middle third ("moderate") and 5 were in the bottom third ("negative").

With these adjective categories it was possible to examine the extent to which subjects' responses were influenced by the desirability of an adjective as well as its degree of independence.

As with the first computer task, the data collected in the second computer task lent themselves to a variety of analyses. The responses for the 4 decisions (rating, certainty, importance, consistency) for each of the 6 adjective categories (positive independent, positive dependent, moderate independent, moderate dependent, negative independent, negative dependent) were examined for possible influence of the interview presentation condition; the latencies of these responses were similarly analyzed. Also, these responses and latencies were submitted to a variety of correlational analyses, both among themselves and with data from the first computer task.

A separate analysis of variance was performed on the responses for each of the 4 decisions for adjectives in each of the 6 categories (i.e., 24 separate analyses), with presentation condition as a between-subjects factor. None of these analyses showed a significant effect of presentation condition. Next, the ratings for the 3 independent adjective categories were included as repeated measures ("desirability"), with presentation condition again a between-subjects variable. There was no effect of condition, either as a main effect, $F(5,96)<1.0$, ns, or in

interaction with the adjective category, $F(10,192)<1.0$, ns. There was a significant effect of the adjective category, $F(2,192)=3.38$, $p<.04$. Surprisingly, on a 9-point scale with 9 the highest, the positive adjectives received lower self-ratings ($M=5.6$) than the moderate ($M=6.0$) or negative adjectives ($M=5.9$). In a similar analysis for the dependent adjectives, none of these effects approached significance.

The disappointing nature of the output from the second computer task extended to the latency measures. Unlike those from the first task, the reaction times for the adjective ratings showed no interesting effects. A series of ANOVA's showed no effect of the interview condition on the decision latency for either the independent or the dependent adjectives. Efforts to make the analyses more powerful, such as using logarithms of the latencies and devising average latency baselines, did not help in uncovering previously undetected effects. Moreover, though it was anticipated that the response on the certainty measure would show a significant negative correlation with the latency of the adjective rating, the correlation did not approach significance ($r=-.12$, $p<.30$). Nor did the adjective rating latency correlate with the consistency ratings ($r=-.002$) or the importance ratings ($r=.01$).

The adjective ratings themselves (rather than the latencies) did correlate with the certainty ratings ($r=.29$, $p<.01$), the consistency ratings ($r=.55$, $p<.0001$) and the

importance ratings ($r=.30$, $p<.01$). While these correlations could be meaningful, the following evidence suggests that they may be due to response bias. The adjective ratings for independent adjectives showed a high positive correlation with the dependent adjective ratings ($r=.46$, $p<.0001$). This correlation could indicate that subjects were responding to the desirability of the adjectives more than to the degree of independence (for example, giving similar ratings to positive independent and dependent adjectives). However, for the independent adjectives the ratings for the positive adjectives and the negative adjectives were also significantly positively correlated ($r=.33$, $p<.01$); for the dependent adjectives this correlation was also positive but it was not significant ($r=.15$, $p=.21$). If the desirability of the adjective were the major influence on subjects' responses, these correlations would be expected to be negative. Therefore, it does not appear that the desirability of the adjectives was overwhelming the degree of independence. Rather, it appears that at least some subjects were giving similar responses to all the adjectives, independent or dependent, positive or negative.

The anomalous finding that the positive independent adjectives received lower average ratings than the moderate or negative adjectives (with no effect of presentation condition), along with the puzzling positive correlations between positive and negative independent adjectives and

between independent and dependent adjectives all suggest that the data from the second task not be given much credence. Perhaps having the subject keep the response finger on the 5 key between responses led to that key serving as an anchor; other possibilities will be addressed later.

Questionnaire

The paper-and-pencil questionnaire that followed the second computer task was substantially more informative. The questions were designed to measure the subject's reactions to and perceptions of the interview, and to assess changes in self-appraisal on independence-related and unrelated traits.

In the major measures in the questionnaire, subjects rated themselves on independence on a 15-point scale, and gave a percentile ranking of how independent they were relative to the university student body. These two measures were combined, since they were highly correlated ($r=.66$, $p<.001$). Table 6 shows z-scores for each group calculated from this combined score. To allow for a repeated measures ANOVA addressing the effect of the interview on self-ratings, a pre-interview z-score was also calculated. The only pre-interview measure available came from the first computer task, in which subjects delineated their latitudes of acceptance and rejection. From this measure, the middle

of the latitude of acceptance (as described previously) was used as the pre-interview measure of independence, and z-scores were calculated. The mixed-model ANOVA, with the self-rating repeated and Latitude and Valence as between-subjects variables, was non-significant, $F(1,96)=1.43$, $p<.25$.

TABLE 6

Independence Self-ratings

Pre-Interview

	LATITUDE		
VALENCE	Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	.27	-.39	--
Less	.00	-.16	.06
Control	.06		

Post-Interview

	LATITUDE		
VALENCE	Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	.35	-.54	--
Less	-.31	-.10	.17
Control	.21		

As expected, the interview presentation condition significantly affected subjects' perceptions of their interview behavior. The mean ratings of the degree to which the subject felt the interview presentation was truthful, representative, or typical are listed in Table 7.

TABLE 7

Perceptions of the Interview Behavior

Measure : Truthful

VALENCE	LATITUDE Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	7.4	7.6	--
Less	8.6	6.2	4.2

Measure : Representative of Me

VALENCE	LATITUDE Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	7.8	7.5	--
Less	8.8	6.1	3.2

Measure : Typical of Me

VALENCE	LATITUDE Acceptance	Rejection	Extreme Rejection
More	7.9	7.5	--
Less	8.8	5.7	3.2

Each of these measures was submitted to a separate 2 (Valence: More/Less Independent) by 2 (Latitude: Acceptance/Rejection) ANOVA, with the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group offset. For each measure there was a Valence by Latitude interaction: For truthful, $F(1,54)=3.84$, $p=.05$; for representative, $F(1,55)=3.64$, $p=.06$; for typical, $F(1,55)=4.14$, $p=.05$. The simple effects for each interaction revealed that in the More Independent conditions the simple effect of Latitude did not approach significance for any of the measures, all F's less than 1.0. In contrast, in the Less Independent

conditions the simple effect of Latitude was significant for all three measures: For truthful, $F(1,54)=7.37$, $p<.01$; for representative, $F(1,55)=5.95$, $p<.02$; for typical, $F(1,55)=10.35$, $p<.01$. Duncan's multiple range tests for each measure (alpha=.05) showed that for representative and typical, the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group differed from every other group; for truthful it differed from every group except the Less Independent/Rejection group. With regard to these measures, then, presentations at the upper bound of the latitude of acceptance were responded to similarly whether they were inside or outside the latitude. At the lower bound, on the other hand, presentations just outside the latitude of acceptance were rated significantly less truthful, representative and typical than those within the latitude. Presentations that were extremely removed from the latitude of acceptance received particularly low ratings.

The presentation condition groups did not significantly differ on the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, $F(5,87)<1.0$, ns. Nor did they differ on a host of other self-ratings assessing mood and other traits. The interview presentation effects discussed above were not caused by, nor did they generalize to, changes on these other dimensions.

CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION

Psychologists have long been interested in the multifaceted nature of the self, and also in the sense of continuity and identity the self confers. William James was influential with his insights into the "multiplicity of social selves" and also into identity as "a Thought moving through time." Earlier in this paper it was suggested that James never truly reconciled the conflict inherent in these two notions. This conflict has re-emerged in recent attempts to come to terms with the stable yet malleble nature of the self (Markus & Kunda, 1986; Rhodewalt, 1986). These authors have proposed that one solution to the apparent paradox might be to focus on the accessibility of self-images, rather than merely on the content of the images. In the present study the potential conflict between the multiple social selves and the sense of identity over time was addressed by having the subject make a self-presentation of a certain degree of accordance with his or her prior self-image. The impact of these self-presentations on subsequent self-appraisals, on the latency of these self-appraisals, and on other measures, was then assessed.

The first self-appraisal measurement used was similar to those of previous studies, in that subjects indicated whether or not a trait adjective (e.g., independent) described them. As expected, the outcome of such a general decision was not affected by the type of self-presentation the subject had made. This null result agrees with the findings of Markus (1977), Markus and Kunda (1986), and Fazio, Herr and Olney (1984). It is not surprising that one presentation did not lead subjects to change their opinion of themselves on such a broad question as "Am I independent?".

The latency of the decision was affected by the presentation, though. Subjects in the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance presentation condition responded more quickly than those in the Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance condition. It appears that the more independent, acceptable presentation made the subsequent overall decision easier, perhaps by rendering the relevant self-images more salient or accessible. This decreased decision latency resembles Fazio, Herr and Olney's (1984) finding that unmanded behavior increased the accessibility of relevant self-images.

In the present study we also saw that subjects who had presented themselves as being far less independent than they could accept responded as quickly as the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group discussed above.

This finding calls to mind the Markus and Kunda (1986) study wherein subjects made to feel either exceptionally similar to or different from confederates were quick to respond to adjectives that reaffirmed their less-extreme self-images. In the present study there is little doubt that the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection presentations were seen as undesirable and threatening, and that the subjects were eager to reaffirm their image of themselves as independent.

Another topic of interest was whether responding to a given adjective would make responding to its synonyms or antonyms easier. While this question was going to be addressed primarily by the second computer task (which turned out to be almost useless), the latencies for these overall decisions were somewhat useful. There was no indication that responding to an adjective helped one in responding to its synonyms or antonyms. While independent, sincere and practical were responded to more rapidly the second time they were presented, this practice effect did not generalize to their antonyms. Nor did responding to conforming and consistent decrease the latency of the decisions for nonconforming and inconsistent. Further, there were no effects even when the adjectives were adjacent and not separated by others. Dependent was immediately followed by nonconforming, and their decision latencies did not differ; that is, there was no decrease in decision time. It is possible that this instance was not a good test of the

hypothesis, since at least some subjects may not have perceived these adjectives as tapping the same underlying dimension, given the many meanings of dependent. Of course, it is also possible that the hypothesis is simply false. Since the answer to this question may help us understand how we think about ourselves, it seems an issue worth pursuing in future research.

In addition to the overall decision, subjects were asked to indicate whether each of nine levels of the given trait (e.g., moderately above average in independence) described them. This format allowed for more precise measurement of the subject's self-ratings than the general decisions just discussed, while still allowing for the assessment of decision latencies. As it turned out, the response patterns on this task were not differentially affected by the various presentation conditions. Though this is still a null result, it is more informative than the finding that the overall decisions did not change. With these more sensitive measures we can be more confident that differences in the subjects' self-appraisals would have been detected, had they occurred. (This finding is supported by the fact that the presentation did not differentially affect the change in independence self-ratings from the pre-interview responses to the final paper questionnaire.) As mentioned in the Introduction, most previous studies addressing accessibility of self-images left untouched the possibility that slight

changes in self-appraisal had occurred that were not detected by the general questions asked.

A further benefit of the computer task used is the information provided by the latencies of the fine-grained decisions. As predicted, the decision latencies varied with the pattern of the responses themselves. Decisions for positions that turned out to be the borders of the latitude of acceptance required the greatest deliberation; the response latencies decreased for positions that were more clearly inside or outside the latitude of acceptance. This "differential latency effect" strongly resembles the "symbolic distance effect" of Rogers, Kuiper and Rogers (1979), in which the time needed to decide which of two adjectives was more self-descriptive was almost perfectly negatively correlated with the difference in previously obtained self-ratings on the adjectives. The present finding also strongly supports the Kuiper (1981) finding that adjectives that were previously assessed as extremely like or unlike the self were responded to much more quickly than adjectives that were only moderately self-descriptive.

This experiment differs from these previous studies in one important regard. The reaction time effects they reported were based on decisions between different trait adjectives, while the present findings involve reaction time for decisions involving degrees of one trait. If we are interested in investigating changes in self-appraisals

within a given trait, which is typically the case, it should prove very beneficial to be able to closely monitor subtle effects, such as decision latency, for varying degrees of the trait. We are not aware of any other study pursuing such a course.

Some may be tempted to dismiss the differential latency effect as merely documenting that difficult decisions require more time than easy ones. However, before the study was run it seemed equally likely (to several knowledgeable colleagues) that one omnibus decision would be made for all the degrees of a given trait, with all subsequent decisions for that trait occurring relatively quickly. The point to be made here is not that a response format could be devised such that subjects would make separate decisions for the individual degrees of a trait (though that is worth noting). Rather, what is more important is that the nature of the subjects' self-images allowed such an approach to work. The self-image is multifaceted and fine-grained, and can be meaningfully appraised in a series of discrete decisions.

Equally as exciting as the differential latency effect itself was the finding that the self-presentations attenuated it. For each of the 5 presentation groups, after the interview focusing on independence the differences in decision latencies for the degrees of that trait were no longer significant. For the no-presentation control group, though, the differential latency effect persisted. It also

persisted for all 6 groups (presentation and control) on 2 traits that had been responded to in the pre-interview session and had not been featured in the interview. Therefore, the attenuation of the differential latency effect for independence for the presentation groups was clearly not caused merely by practice; rather, the self-presentation seems directly responsible.

One possible interpretation of this finding is that the thought and effort involved in the presentation helped to consolidate the relevant self-images into a more cohesive whole, leading to a single monolithic decision. That is, upon seeing the adjective and the scale the subject may have made one decision as to which positions were self-descriptive, later referring back to this decision when responding to the highlighted positions. Alternatively, the decisions may have remained separate and just not differed significantly in latency: If the presentation rendered all the decisions easier, the previously difficult, lengthy decisions might show marked decreases in latency, while the decisions that had been easy would not have had much room for improvement; the latencies would thus be leveled out.

The figures in Appendix D showing the decision latencies for each of the 5 presentation groups seem to lend more weight to the second of these possible interpretations. Although the differences in latencies are not statistically significant for any of the groups, the latencies do not seem

to reflect a single monolithic decision. In fact, there are some interesting patterns that warrant future investigation. For instance, the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group and the Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group--the two groups that showed the greatest decrease in latency for the overall independent decision--both showed longer latencies for the position just below the latitude of acceptance than for any other position. In contrast, the Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group and the Less Independent/Latitude of Rejection group both showed greater latencies for the position just more independent than the latitude of acceptance. Although these effects were not significant in the present study, they might be worth pursuing in future studies for the insights they might provide concerning reactions to various self-presentations.

Jones et al. (1981) posited that the self is asymmetrically structured, with a sharp distinction between self and nonself at the negative end but a looser, less defined structure at the positive end. In addition to the possible trends in decision latencies just mentioned, in the present study possible support for this hypothesis can be seen in subjects' perceptions of their interview presentations. On ratings of how truthful, representative and typical of themselves their presentations were, in the More Independent conditions there were no differences between the Latitude of Acceptance and the Latitude of

Rejection groups; in contrast, in the Less Independent conditions, presentations within the latitude of acceptance were rated much higher on these measures than presentations in the latitude of rejection, with the Extreme Rejection group giving extremely low ratings. Thus, it appears that the distinction between the latitude of acceptance and the latitude of rejection is more important toward the negative end of the scale than the positive.

However, this interpretation becomes less convincing when on recalls that the More Independent groups did not differ on the manipulation checks, most importantly the comparison of the interview presentation with their usual self-image. Since the More Independent/Latitude of Rejection group did not perceive their presentation to be any less in line with their usual self-image, perhaps it is not surprising that they did not perceive it as any less truthful, representative, or typical of themselves than did the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group. In fairness to Jones et al., this finding (that the More Independent/Latitude of Rejection group did not rate their presentation as less congruent with their usual self-image than the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group) itself supports the idea that the acceptance-rejection distinction is not very potent toward the positive end of the scale, as Jones et al suggested. Jones et al. addressed the effect of self-presentations on self-esteem-ratings; the

present findings expand the asymmetry hypothesis to include decisions about the relationship of the self-presentation to the self.

Another point of interest from these ratings is that the Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group consistently gave the highest ratings on the truthful, representative, and typical measures (though these ratings were not significantly higher than those of the More Independent groups). If this finding can be corroborated in future studies it might show nicely the limits to--in fact, a counter-example to--a self-enhancement effect that is virtually ubiquitous in self-presentation research. Usually subjects making positive presentations rate them as highly truthful while those making negative presentations disparage their accuracy. In the present case, though, it appears that subjects might be admitting that the lower range of their latitude of acceptance is the most accurate and representative, implying that the upper reaches of the latitude of acceptance might indicate self-aggrandizement or wishful thinking. A more pointed examination of this possibility might entail having the ratings of the presentations or the scale positions occur within-subjects, although this approach might encounter new difficulties.

As alluded to earlier, the task that had subjects respond to stimulus adjectives and related questions by using a 9-digit number pad provided almost no intelligible results.

The responses themselves seemed to be predominantly influenced by response bias, and the response latencies showed virtually no effects. In this task, subjects were asked to keep their finger on the 5-key between reponses, in an attempt to reduce error variance on the latency measures. This instruction may have led to the 5-key serving as an anchor, leading to similar responses for positive or negative and independent or dependent adjectives. It is also possible that subjects were operating under the mistaken heuristic that a higher response was always more favorable, when in fact lower responses were more favorable for negative adjectives. Finally, it is possible that the task simply failed to hold the subjects' interest and they were merely hurrying to complete the task and not fully attending to their responses. The task came immediately after another fairly demanding task, and required 120 rather complex decisions. In any case, in this study this task was of little use. Since it might prove helpful to have decision latencies for this type of multiple-response decision, it may be worthwhile to reassess this task under better conditions, for instance having it be the only task and also by providing more explicit instructions about the implications of the possible responses. With regards to the present study, the failure of this task emphasized the value of the first computer task in terms of collecting response latencies for decisions involving degrees of a trait.

Unfortunately, the other task could not completely replace this one. For instance, some of the questions raised regarding the Markus and Kunda study could have been addressed in comparing the responses to the 15 independent and the 15 dependent synonyms, but could not be completely addressed by the other task.

This study has shed light on the nature of self-appraisals and the influence of self-presentations upon these self-appraisals. As with previous studies, there was evidence for both the malleability and the stability of the self. Response latencies for self-appraisals were influenced by the self-presentations, showing the malleability discussed by Markus and Kunda (1986). In that study the fact that the self-ratings were not significantly influenced by the manipulations was seen as suggesting the stability of the self. In the present study this stability of self-ratings was also seen; because the measures used were more sensitive than those used by Markus and Kunda, this finding is more solid evidence of the stability of self-ratings.

As a final note it might be suggested that the tasks used in this study did not truly serve to differentiate between passive and active processing. Although differences in reaction time were observed, these differences are probably quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. Given the nature of the task and the environment, it is unlikely that

even the rapid decisions were the result of passive processing. Rather, the novelty of the task probably led to a fair amount of self-inspection, as opposed to more automatic responding suggested in passive processing. Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the extent to which the self-presentation was self-congruent could have meaningfully influenced whether the subsequent self-appraisals reflected passive or active processing. Most obviously, the self-appraisals followed the self-presentations by several minutes. With this amount of intervening time, in order for the presentation to affect the self-appraisal there would need to be some reflection upon it, which would be in the realm of active, not passive, processing.

It might be possible to apply the present framework to the self-presentation itself: Self-congruent presentations might be made more quickly than incongruent ones, the former being more readily accessible. Even here, however, just being in an interview situation might arouse active processing in the respondents. Perhaps other approaches might more adequately differentiate active and passive processing. For instance, McDonald and Kuiper used a concurrent memory task (cf. Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) in suggesting that self-schema processing is an automatic process that does not demand attentional capacity.

In summary, each of the presentation groups showed interesting and meaningful responses to the presentation.

The More Independent/Latitude of Rejection group did not see the presentation as any less truthful or representative than the More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group, but the former group did not show the increased accessibility of self-images that the latter did. The More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group seemed to respond most favorably to the presentation: They rated it high in truthfulness, and it also made the subsequent overall independent decision easier. The Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance group also rated the presentation as very truthful, but for this group the overall independent decision latency did not improve (they were the only group to show no improvement). Perhaps the benefit of practice was eliminated by having made a presentation that led them to question their level of independence. The Less Independent/Latitude of Rejection group did not seem to be affected in this way. They saw the presentation as not very truthful or representative, and were not greatly affected by it. The Less Independent/Extreme Rejection group rated the presentation as even less truthful or representative, but they were nonetheless affected by it. As with subjects in the Markus and Kunda study, this group was very quick to reaffirm that they were not as extreme on this dimension as it appeared.

Our understanding of the self has benefitted from the use of the tools and techniques of social cognition, as well as

from the study of changes in self-appraisals following assigned self-presentations. It is hoped that this study has shown that further benefits can be gained by combining these two approaches.

APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

I. Scenarios

1) If you've had a bad day, are you more likely to do something alone, like exercise, read a book, or watch T.V., or something in a group, like talk to friends or go out with a bunch of people?

alone _____ together _____

2) If you were discussing a movie with friends and they all liked it but you thought it was terrible, would you state your opinions or go along with the group?

state opinions _____ go along _____

3) Would you ever get serious about a man / woman that you knew your family and friends disliked?

yes _____ no _____

4) What do you think about people with unusual haircuts or clothes?

like or don't care _____ dislike _____

5) If you're having a problem, are you more likely to try to work it out on your own or ask other people for advice or help?

work it out _____ ask for help _____

II. Dyads (100 points between the pair)

1) original _____	companionable _____
2) progressive _____	good-tempered _____
3) amusing _____	creative _____
4) studious _____	self-confident _____
5) self-sufficient ____	social _____
6) prudent _____	bold _____
7) appreciative _____	ambitious _____
8) cooperative _____	individualistic _____
9) adventurous_____	outgoing _____
10) outgoing _____	easygoing _____
11) obliging _____	strong-minded _____
12) outspoken _____	reserved _____

III. Scale ratings on "Agree it's me"

(1 to 7 scale, with 7 highest)

1) autonomous _____	2) conforming ____
3) leader _____	4) relies on others ____
5) strong-willed ___	6) follower ____
7) self-assured ____	

IV. Percentile Ranking on Independent (01 to 99) _____

APPENDIX B
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPUTER-AIDED PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT

Did you like the task?

not at all 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 very much

Was the task difficult?

not at all 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 very much

Were the instructions clear?

not at all 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 very much

How much more difficult, if at all, was it to respond in this format (that is, on the computer) than on similar paper-and-pencil questionnaires?

not at all 1 - 2 - 3 - 4 - 5 - 6 - 7 very much

Do you have any suggestions as to how we might improve the task?

APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SIMULATED INTERVIEW PROJECT

The Psychology Department is interested in obtaining the reactions of students who participate in the various projects conducted as instructional aids.
Therefore, we would like you to complete the questionnaires in this packet. Please complete all the measures in the order presented. Your responses will be completely confidential; the interviewers will receive feedback only in the form of group data, and will not know how each individual responded. Please be honest so we can better evaluate this project. Thank you.

1) How enjoyable was participating in the project?

extremely unenjoyable 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 extremely enjoyable

2) How interesting was the project?

extremely uninteresting 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 extremely interesting

3) How worthwhile do you feel your participation was, for the students in the interview class?

extremely unworthwhile 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 extremely worthwhile

Since the interview dealt with Independence, we need to collect normative data (i.e., group norms) on that trait.

So, please rate how rate how dependent or independent you see yourself.

01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:10:11:12:13:14:15

DEPENDENT INDEPENDENT

Please give a percentile ranking of how Independent you are, relative to the University of Florida student body. That is, where do you think you rank?
(0=the least independent, 99=the most independent)

0-5-10-15-20-25-30-35-40-45-50-55-60-65-70-75-80-85-90-95-99

Please rate how you feel about yourself by circling the appropriate number on each of the following scales.

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

conforming non-conforming

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

affected by unaffected by
peer pressure peer pressure

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

relies on self-sufficient
others

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

follower leader

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

weak-willed strong-willed

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

inconsistent consistent

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

impractical practical

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

self-deceiving self-knowledgeable

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

irresponsible responsible

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

incompetent competent

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

guarded candid

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

dishonest honest

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

deceptive truthful

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

plastic real

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

insincere sincere

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

unintelligent intelligent

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

unfriendly friendly

Please rate how you feel right now, by circling the appropriate number on each of the following scales.

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

tense relaxed

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

depressed cheerful

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

worried at ease

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

dissatisfied satisfied

1:2:3:4:5:6:7:8:9:10:11:12:13:14:15

sad happy

Please answer each of the following questions by circling the appropriate number on the scale that follows (1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = neither disagree e nor agree, 4 = agree, 5 = strongly agree).

1) I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others.

strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

2) I feel that I have a number of good qualities.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

3) All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

4) I am able to do things as well as most other people.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

5) I feel that I do not have much to be proud of.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

6) I take a positive attitude toward people.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

7) On the whole, I am satisfied with myself.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

8) I wish I could have more respect for myself.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

9) I certainly feel useless at times.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

10) At times, I think I am no good at all.
strongly disagree 1-2-3-4-5 strongly agree

Please answer the following questions about the interview by circling the appropriate number on each of the scales.

1) How much choice do you feel you had in whether or not to participate?

no choice at all 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 totally free choice

2) How obligated did you feel to participate and perform the role?

not obligated at all 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 very obligated

3) How personally reponsible do you feel for the way you presented yourself to the interviewer?

not at all responsible 1-2-3-4-5-6-7 totally responsible

Please rate your behavior during the interview by circling the appropriate number on the scales below.

calculated	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	spontaneous
deceptive	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	truthful
fake	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	genuine
unrepresentative of me	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	representative of me
atypical of me	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	typical of me
superficial	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	deep
harmful	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	helpful
unimportant	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	important
self-derogatory	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	self-enhancing
unjustifiable	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	justifiable

required	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	voluntary
detrimental	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	beneficial
constrained	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	free
tense	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	relaxed
nervous	1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11	calm

What role were you supposed to play during the interview? That is, how independent were you supposed to be? Mark with an X.

: Extremely above average
: Very much above average
: Moderately above average
: Slightly above average
: Average _____
: Slightly below average
: Moderately below average
: Very much below average
: Extremely below average

How does this description compare to the way you usually think of yourself on this dimension?

01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:10:11:12:13:14:15

far worse same far better

Now, circle the role that you think you created during the interview (that is, the position on the scale that

you came across as being). If the X and the circle are on the same spot, that's fine; if not, that's fine too.

How does this description compare to the way you usually think of yourself on this dimension?

01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:10:11:12:13:14:15

far worse same far better

How much thought did you invest in answering the interview questions?

01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:10:11:12:13:14:15

not at all moderate a great deal
amount

How nervous or anxious did you feel in the interview?

01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:10:11:12:13:14:15

not at all moderate a great deal
amount

APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTAL FIGURES



Figure 9: Latencies for Positions of Independent: More Independent/Latitude of Rejection Group



Figure 10: Latencies for Positions of Independent: More Independent/Latitude of Acceptance Group



Figure 11: Latencies for Positions of Independent: Less Independent/Latitude of Acceptance Group



Figure 12: Latencies for Positions of Independent: Less Independent/Latitude of Rejection Group



Figure 13: Latencies for Positions of Independent: Less Independent/Extreme Rejection Group

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James Vincent Trudeau was born in New Orleans in 1958 and was graduated from Edison High School in Alexandria, VA, in 1977. He received a B.A. in psychology and German from Grinnell College in 1981 and an M.S. in psychology from the University of Florida in 1986.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Professor of Psychology

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

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